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ABSTRACT 
Since the migration of DOD messaging to the DMS has 
been mandated, implementation has been less than ideal and 
otherwise unsuccessful.  DMS users have reported 
dissatisfaction with the systems maintenance and security 
support burdens in the current client-server model.  NREMS 
introduces a networked environment capable of push 
technology and centralized database and security management 
which should significantly reduce the DMS shortfalls that 
have made the system lack appeal to the end user.  As the 
DOD seeks to solve these issues, other potential issues are 
introduced that must be reviewed and addressed to ensure a 
successful implementation of the NREMS.  
The Architecture Trade-off Analysis Method (ATAM) and 
user surveys formed the basis for analysis, conclusions, 
and recommendations. The goal of the ATAM is to understand 
the consequences of architectural decisions with respect to 
the quality attribute requirements of the system.  User 
surveys provided the data to characterize the current naval 
messaging business process for each naval command and 
across the Navy with the prospect of properly defining 
future NREMS users. Combined analysis provided a clear 
understanding of the alternative architecture to the 
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This thesis will focus on the Defense Messaging System 
(DMS) and its integration into the Navy Regional Enterprise 
Messaging System (NREMS).  The transition from DMS to NREMS 
will occur at the same time as the transition from the 
Automatic Digital Network (AUTODIN) to DMS is completed.  
Much anecdotal evidence exists to support end users’ 
perception that the transition from AUTODIN to DMS was 
extremely difficult.  The services did not have the 
infrastructure required to implement DMS, i.e., a 
sufficient local area network to support message traffic, 
FORTEZZA cards, or the Personal Computer Memory Card 
International Association (PCMCIA) cards.  These costs were 
to be funded by local activities with limited budgets or 
understanding of DMS and its requirements.  Initially, 
message service was slow at best and users were reluctant 
to transition from AUTODIN for fear of not receiving 
critical messages.  In many cases, AUTODIN continues to 
operate, with DMS still not fully implemented. 
The legacy of the transition from AUTODIN to NREMS is 
a tremendous amount of user distrust and reluctance to 
change, again, to a different system when AUTODIN hasn’t 
been completely phased out, and NREMS has yet to be fully 
implemented.  The purpose of this thesis is to articulate 
to the NREMS end user the following questions and responses 
with supporting research and analysis: 
 Why the transition from DMS to NREMS?  NREMS is a 
more cost effective solution requiring fewer 
resources than DMS that fulfills the requirements 
of Naval messaging. 
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 How will the transition be accomplished?  Six 
defined business processes have been designed to 
support different Naval messaging organizational 
requirements.  A decision tree will be provided 
to assist Naval messaging organizations in 
determining which business process best fits 
their messaging needs.   
A. OBJECTIVES 
This thesis will focus on the functional contribution 
and change management of the NREMS program implementation 
into the Navy.  The NREMS architecture will be evaluated in 
a standardized manner utilizing the Architecture Trade-off 
Analysis Method (ATAM).  The NREMS program implementation 
will be evaluated utilizing Todd Jick’s (noted Harvard 
Business School change strategist) Ten Commandments of 
Implementing Change.  Finally, Naval messaging user surveys 
will be used to characterize each Naval messaging 
organization’s business process once transitioned to NREMS.  
To help reach this objective, the following supporting 
research questions were explored: 
 How does the Classic DMS to NREMS architecture 
change contribute to: (1) the CNO direction for 
consolidation of communications resources on home 
soil, and (2) the CNO direction to transition off 
of and close down legacy systems?  
 What is the current Classic client server 
DMS architecture and where is it deployed?  
 What is the current NREMS architecture, its 
technical advantages, and where will it be 
deployed? 
 How does the NREMS implementation answer the 
CNO's direction and what are the key 
benefits in cost and performance?  
 Evaluate the transition from DMS to NREMS. 
 Is the transition plan from DMS to NREMS 
effective?  What are its strengths and 
weaknesses? 
3 
 Determine Naval messaging organizations’ 
business process.  How can commands be 
differentiated to support appropriate levels 
of service in order to create the 
appropriate requirements document for 
contract awarded to support NREMS?   
B. SCOPE 
The purpose of this thesis is to: 
 Analyze the current and proposed naval messaging 
architectures and determine if NREMS will support 
Navy messaging requirements. 
 Analyze the transition plan to determine its 
strengths and weaknesses. 
 Provide a database, preformatted queries and 
preformatted reports that characterize Naval 
messaging business processes. 
This research will not: 
 Propose specific change actions for the 
implementation plan which is well underway.   
 Provide recommended training programs as they 
have already been developed. 
C. ORGANIZATION 
Chapter II provides background material regarding the 
change requirement for Naval messaging.   
Chapter III provides an analysis of the NREMS 
transition plan from a change management perspective. 
Chapter IV presents a review of both Naval messaging 
architectures, DMS and NREMS.   
Chapter V presents the research methodology used for 
the analysis of the architecture and the development of 
appropriate business processes. 
Chapter VI presents is devoted to analysis:  
architecture and business processes. 
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Chapter VII provides the thesis conclusions. 
Chapter VIII provides recommendations. 
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II. BACKGROUND  
The Department of Defense’s (DOD) Defense Message 
System (DMS) was developed as a replacement for DOD’s 
antiquated AUTODIN system and was mandated as the messaging 
solution of choice for DOD in 1989.  It is also cited as 
the solution for the Global Command and Control System 
(GCCS) Infrastructure Messaging Requirement.  In October 
2003, the Navy mandated a “Navy Enterprise DMS Messaging 
Solution.”1  In this chapter, we will discuss the history of 
the Navy’s change requirement from the DMS client-server 
architecture to the Navy Regional Enterprise Messaging 
System (NREMS). 
A. NREMS GENESIS 
The requirement for NREMS began when the Commander, 
Fleet Forces Command recognized that the Navy’s 
implementation of DMS did not support all of the Navy’s 
needs for Naval Messaging.  The Commander, Fleet Forces 
Command tasked the Naval Network Warfare Command with 
developing the future of Naval messaging.  The Naval 
Network Warfare Command created the Naval Messaging Working 
Group, staffed with Naval messaging stakeholders, to manage 
the transition to the future Naval messaging system.  
1.   Commander, Fleet Forces Command (COMFLTFORCOM)  
The Commander, Fleet Forces Command issued a message 
in October 2003 to outline a requirement for a standard 
Navy Enterprise DMS messaging solution to provide automated 
messaging and handling services for commands in both the  
 
 
                     
1 Cited from the Commander, Fleet Forces Command Message dated 14 
October 2003.   
6 
continental United States and outside of the continental 
Unites States commands.  The Commander, Fleet Forces 
Command requested a solution that would address: 
 Complex profiling 
 Storage/retrospective search of archived messages 
 Messaging utilities 
 Servicing of non-delivery notices 
The Commander, Fleet Forces Command also believed this 
to be the ideal opportunity to resolve existing 
installation, operations and maintenance issues related to 
the transition from AUTODIN to DMS which had not been 
entirely successful.  These issues would be addressed by 
eliminating client software through the use of a web-
enabled messaging portal, consolidating FORTEZZA cards at 
the regional messaging centers, and consolidating Navy DMS 
Messaging and IT experts at the regional sites where the 
assets would now be located. 
Currently, Naval messaging assets are inconsistently 
maintained and manned depending on the expertise and 
resources available to individual commands.  Software 
updates for client software are inconsistently applied and 
hardware suites are not consistently configured or 
maintained making it extremely difficult to address the 
multitude of issues that may arise.  Commands would 
configure their DMS software and hardware to meet local 
needs and minimally address interoperability issues within 
Naval messaging.  NREMS was commissioned to solve these 




The end state will move complex messaging tasks from 
non-IT personnel to messaging professionals, and will 
allow a reduction in the number of local control 
centers and regional server sites … (thereby 
presenting) an opportunity to mitigate DMS 
installation, operations and maintenance issues, and 
improve governance, performance, security and cost.2  
The evaluation criteria for the messaging requirement 
had to meet the following: 
 Governance.  The structure and policies of the 
solution would apply to all potential regional 
messaging centers with an emphasis on the 
standardization of delivery structures.    
 Performance.  Performance standards would be 
established that would mitigate lengthy down-
times for Naval messaging.   
 Security.  Special handling for different 
categories of messages (classified vs. 
unclassified) with an emphasis on security 
clearance and control of access to messages. 
 Cost.  The solution must be evaluated using a 
cost/performance comparison model.  The solution 
set should include government owned/government 
operated, government owned/contractor operated, 
contractor owned/contractor operated and any 
potential solutions offered by the NMCI contract. 
The Commander, Fleet Forces Command requested that the 
Naval Network Warfare Command (NETWARCOM) develop the 
details and options.  The Naval Network Warfare Command 
established the Naval Messaging Working Group (NMWG) to 
address the issues set forth by the Commander, Fleet Forces 
Command.  The NMWG members have included Space and Naval 
Warfare Systems Command (U.S. Navy); the Naval Network 
Warfare Command; the Commander, Pacific Fleet; Naval 
Computer and Telecommunications Area Master Station, 
Atlantic; Naval Computer and Telecommunications Area 
                     
2 Cited from the Commander, Fleet Forces Command Message dated 14 
October 2003. 
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Master Station, Pacific; Office of the Chief of Naval 
Operations; and contractors Mitre and Booz Allen Hamilton. 
In December 2003, the NMWG quickly recommended that 
the DISA approved Automated Message Handling System (AMHS) 
will be the base product for NREMS.  The Naval Network 
Warfare Command approved the use of the AMHS. 
In May 2004, the Naval Network Warfare Command halted 
the planned shift of DMS customer support, server 
operations/maintenance, and client upgrades under the NMCI 
CLIN 21 process.3  This paved the way for the NMWG to 
determine an appropriate solution for the Navy’s messaging 
requirements. 
2. Naval Messaging Working Group 
In July 2004, the NMWG, led by the Space and Naval 
Warfare Systems Command (U.S. Navy), presented a decision 
brief to the Naval Network Warfare Command on the 
implementation plan for NREMS.  As will become evident in 
later chapters, NREMS is only an architecturally different 
implementation of DOD’s mandated DMS.  NREMS is still DMS, 
simply web-enabled instead of a client-server architecture.  
Therefore, the Navy’s messaging business process is still 
consistent with the architecture outlined by DOD’s Global 
Command and Control System.  It is not a stove-piped system 
unable to operate with the messaging systems of the other 
military services.   
The implementation plan recommended by the Space and 
Naval Warfare Systems Command (U.S. Navy) included the 
following key attributes: 
                     
3 Cited from the Commander Naval Network Warfare Command Message 
dated May 10, 2004.   
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 Consolidation of the Navy’s 23 DMS service 
provider sites to six regional message centers 
(Naval Computer and Telecommunications Area 
Master Station, Atlantic; Naval Computer and 
Telecommunications Area Master Station, Pacific; 
Naval Computer and Telecommunications Area Master 
Station, Central Europe; Naval Computer and 
Telecommunications Station, Far East; Naval 
Computer and Telecommunications Station, San 
Diego; and Naval Computer and Telecommunications 
Station, Bahrain).  In December 2004, The Naval 
Network Warfare Command recommended consolidation 
of the six sites to two sites (Naval Computer and 
Telecommunications Area Master Station, Atlantic 
and Naval Computer and Telecommunications Area 
Master Station, Pacific) with the possibility of 
retaining the Naval Computer and 
Telecommunications Station, San Diego if the two 
sites cannot support the needs of NREMS.   
 DMS client/server and legacy message users will 
transition to a web-enabled system that 
eliminates the DMS client software and FORTEZZA 
at the command desktop.  Instead, NREMS will use 
an Automated Message Handling System (AMHS), a 
Defense Information Systems Agency (U.S. DoD) 
approved DMS core product. 
 Optional email distribution to support the 
transition of command business processes 
including automatic message generators and 
parsers (e.g., the Global Command and Control 
System-Maritime). 
 Automation of high precedence message 
notification. 
Under this plan, the test sites for NREMS were Naval 
Computer and Telecommunications Station, Far East and Naval 
Computer and Telecommunications Area Master Station, 
Pacific.  The pilot system was installed at Naval Computer 
and Telecommunications Station, Far East in February 2005.  
The focus of the transition is shore-based DMS 
implementation that is web-enabled.  Afloat forces will be 
addressed at a later date. 
10 
The Naval Network Warfare Command published the NREMS 
Implementation Plan via a Commander, Naval Network Warfare 
Command Message dated July 9, 2004.  The message outlined 
the plan and actions required of responsible parties:  the 
Naval Messaging Working Group provides operational 
direction, the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations 
secures long term funding and Space and Naval Warfare 
Systems Command (U.S. Navy) develops, updates and executes 
the implementation plan. 
B. NREMS PROJECT 
The Commander, Fleet Forces Command created the 
requirement for an improved Naval messaging process.  The 
Naval Network Warfare Command, the Naval Messaging Working 
Group, and the Space and Warfare Systems Command defined 
the goal and features of the future Naval messaging 
process.  The following discussion will explain the goal 
and features of the NREMS project.   
1. Goal 
The goal of the NREMS project is a common messaging 
service that offers centralized management, improved 
configuration management, a simplified user interface and 
results in some cost savings.   
2. Features 
The NREMS project fulfills the stated goal by reducing 
the number of sites and supporting personnel (cost 
savings), providing a system that can support the Net-
Centric Enterprise Services strategy with a joint DMS core 
product (improved configuration management) and providing 
common business practices.  NREMS also provides a 
simplified user interface with a single message store at a 
regional node.  
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a. Site and Manpower Reduction 
NREMS requires a minimum number of messaging 
centers reducing the number of sites from 24 to 2.  The 
personnel and resources required to support messaging at 
the additional sites can now be eliminated with appropriate 
resources, expertise, and manpower allocated and 
centralized at the two remaining sites.  
Additionally, client software and FORTEZZA cards 
will not be required at the command desktops.  Command 
resources and manpower can be reallocated to support other 
requirements. 
b. Consistent with Net-Centric Enterprise 
Services (NCES) Strategy 
NCES enables information sharing by connecting 
people and systems that have information to people and 
systems that need information.  For people who have 
information, NCES provides global information advertising 
and delivery services.  For people who need information, 
NCES provides global services to find and receive 
information.  NCES requires that data be visible, 
accessible and understandable primarily through the use of 
XML tagging.  Additionally, information must come from a 
trusted source and be provided in a format that is 
interoperable with other systems.  NCES must also be 
responsive to user needs and requirements.   
NREMS will migrate Naval messaging to two Naval 
message stores that can be easily tagged and referenced 
using appropriate key words.  Not only will messages be 
available for retrospective search within NREMS, but easily 
accessed by an information consumer through a metadata 
registry.  An information consumer can access information 
12 
of interest about any topic, for example, all weather or 
intelligence messages about a particular region of Iraq.  
NREMS messages would be sent using NREMS, but would also be 
available to NCES users through a federated search. 
Conceptually, DISA envisions that most Navy 
organizational messaging will be indexed and stored in a 
data repository that will create a metadata card for each 
message for use by the federated search catalog as a 
reference. 
c. Joint DMS Core Product 
With the selection of the Defense Information 
Systems Agency’s (U.S. DoD) AMHS DMS core product, NREMS 
remains an interoperable messaging system and fulfills the 
architecture requirements of the Global Command and Control 
System.  It remains a joint DOD product. 
d. Single Message Store at a Regional Node 
The Naval Computer and Telecommunications Area 
Master Station, Pacific will warehouse all messages for the 
Pacific Theater and house the backup servers for the 
Atlantic Theater.  The Naval Computer and 
Telecommunications Area Master Station, Atlantic will 
warehouse all messages for the Atlantic Theater and house 
the backup servers for the Pacific Theater.  The entire 
message store for Naval messaging will exist at both sites 
in the event that one site’s service is interrupted.  The 
Naval Computer and Telecommunications Area Master Station, 
Pacific and The Naval Computer and Telecommunications Area 





e. Common Business Practices 
NREMS eliminates client software and FORTEZZA 
cards at the command desktop.  Commands are no longer 
required to update local client software or maintain 
control of FORTEZZA cards.  The software and FORTEZZA cards 
will be resident at the Naval Computer and 
Telecommunications Area Master Station, Pacific and the 
Naval Computer and Telecommunications Area Master Station, 
Atlantic.  Messages will be accessed through a web portal 
which eliminates inconsistent software and hardware 
configurations across Naval messaging.  Messages can be 
sent and received from any personal computer with a web 
browser by authorized personnel appropriately registered 
with the NREMS website. 
C. CURRENT STATUS OF NREMS 
The original implementation plan called for 
implementation in the Pacific theater in fiscal year 2006 
(FY06).  An NREMS FY 06 budget cut reduced implementation 
efforts to lab testing and certification.  The lab testing 
began in August 2006 at the Space and Naval Warfare Systems 
Command (U.S. Navy), San Diego and is on-going.  The actual 
installation was moved to FY 07.  
Procurement of all software and hardware is complete 
as well as award of NMCI CLINs in support of NREMS.  Each 
of the two sites will receive 90 servers, 8 racks and 58 
additional hardware components to support NREMS 
implementation.  NMCI will provide the connectivity between 





DMZ between the NREMS servers and the internet, and 
authority to install Active X controls on all NREMS work 
stations.4   
Implementation is scheduled to begin in the Pacific 
theater with the installation of all hardware and software 
required at the Naval Computer and Telecommunications Area 
Master Station, Pacific.  Additionally, the backup servers 
will be installed at the Naval Computer and 
Telecommunications Area Master Station, Atlantic for the 
Pacific theater before the transition can begin.  Small 
commands will be brought online first.  Starting with the 
smaller commands gives the Space and Naval Warfare Systems 
Command (U.S. Navy) the flexibility to adjust as necessary 
as they observe the impact on NREMS bandwidth and any 
unforeseen events.  Implementation will progress one 
command at a time and is not intended to move forward until 
each command is brought completely online.  NREMS is 
scheduled to be fully operational in November 2008 (see 
Figure 1). 
                     
4 Bob Delizo, Navy Regional Enterprise Messaging System (NREMS) 




Figure 1.   NREMS Implementation Schedule5 
 
The command transition plan as outlined by the Space 
and Naval Warfare Systems Command (U.S. Navy) is as 
follows:6 
1.   A command submits an NREMS Organization 
Registration Form to the DMS Service Provider 
(DSP). 
2.   Command users and command message administrators 
(CMA) complete online training courses. 
3.   The DSP generates an X.509 form and new 
certificate for the command (PKI certificate). 
4.   DSP installs the command’s certificate on NREMS. 
5.   The CMA configures user accounts, permissions and 
profiles. 
                     
5 Bob Delizo, Navy Regional Enterprise Messaging System (NREMS) 
Program Status Presentation. (12 February 2007). 
6 Ibid. 
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6.   Command users login to accounts and confirm 
access. 
7.   The DSP transitions the command in the DMS 
directory from a DMS user to an NREMS-DMS user. 
When all of the above steps are successfully completed, a 
command has transitioned from DMS to NREMS. 
D. FUTURE STATE OF NREMS 
Once shore-based commands have successfully 
transitioned to NREMS, it is hoped that the transition can 
be extended to afloat commands as well.  The Commander, 
Fleet Forces Command endorsed a fleet requirement for two-
way IP based messaging.  DMS and NREMS cannot fully support 
this requirement yet.  Once resolved, NREMS can move 
forward afloat. 
The AMHS in concert with NCES will be updated with the 
federated search capability.  AMHS databases will be 
provided with a “side door” merge as well to support the 
NCES strategy of a network-based information environment 
that will meet the requirement for information superiority 
and decision superiority.  The side door will allow easy 
access to all AMHS databases by the federated search 
engine. 
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III. CHANGE MANAGEMENT FOR DOD COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS 
As one can imagine, there are numerous texts on change 
management and many approaches.  This thesis will focus on 
one approach advocated by Jick of the Harvard Business 
School.  Through this research, he has developed his  
Ten Commandments of Implementing Change.7 
1.   Analyze the organization and its need for change. 
2.   Create a shared vision and common direction. 
3.   Separate from the past. 
4.   Create a sense of urgency. 
5.   Support a strong leader role. 
6.   Line up political sponsorship. 
7.   Craft an implementation plan. 
8.   Develop enabling structures. 
9.   Communicate, involve people, and be honest. 
10.  Reinforce and institutionalize change. 
In this chapter, we will discuss the Navy’s transition from 
DMS to NREMS and compare the Navy’s approach with Jick’s 
Ten Commandments.  
A. CATALYST FOR CHANGE 
In April 2003, the DOD’s Inspector General identified 
several weaknesses in DMS Release 2.2.  DMS Release 2.2 
could not meet all twelve Multicommand Required Operational 
Capability (MROC) 3-88 messaging system requirements. (See 
Table 1).  DMS could not process and protect all messages 
at the appropriate level of security.  Classified messages 
could be transmitted on the unclassified side without 
detection.  Messages might or might not be delivered to the 
intended recipients if delivered at all.  During panel 
                     
7 Todd D. Jick, Managing Change: Cases and Concepts. Homewood, IL: 
Irwin, 1993, Module 3, for a more thorough explanation of his ten 
commandments.  
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discussions, the Navy noted message non-delivery as a 
significant issue.  Message integrity could not be 
guaranteed. No safeguards existed to protect messages from 
interception or alteration.  Adequate measures were not in 
place to assure the availability and reliability of DMS.  
The IG report did note that each of these issues would be 
resolved by DMS Release 3.0.  However, in discussions with 
SPAWAR, non-delivery notifications and protection of 
messages at the appropriate classification level are still 
issues of concern, although improved. 
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Table 1.   DMS Multicommand Required Operational Capability 
(MROC) 3-88 Requirements 
 
The IG report also noted that the cost savings of $435 
million originally estimated for the transition from 
AUTODIN to DMS were not realized.  The aging and antiquated 
AUTODIN system continues in use along with DMS.  Two 
systems are being supported simultaneously until AUTODIN is 
1. Connectivity/Interoperability: Allow user to communicate with any 
other user within the DMS community and provide system users with 
standard interfaces to other Government agencies, allies, Defense 
contractors, and other approved activities external to the DMS 
community. 
2. Message Delivery: System must deliver messages to the intended 
recipient(s) with a high degree of certainty. System must notify the 
sender when unable to deliver a message and provide message 
accountability and traceability from writer to reader. 
3. Timely Delivery: System must provide at least two levels of 
precedence and transmission priorities and at least two levels of 
importance indicators. System must provide support for changing 
traffic loads and conditions in time of peace, crisis, and war, such 
that all messaging characteristics continue to be achieved. 
4. Confidentiality/Security: System is to provide the capability to 
process and protect all message traffic, to include unclassified, 
classified, and sensitive messages at appropriate security levels and 
compartments. 
5. Sender Authentication: System must have the capability to 
unambiguously verify and prove that information marked as originating 
at a given source did, in fact, originate there. 
6. Integrity: Information received must be the same as the 
information sent and the system must provide the user with a 
selectable verification mechanism. 
7. Availability/Reliability: System must provide users with a message 
service on a continuous basis. 
8. Training: System must be flexible and responsive enough to allow 
the user to operate DMS without extensive training. 
9. Identification of Recipients: System must allow sender to 
unambiguously identify the intended recipient by organization or 
individual. 
10. Message Preparation Support: Preparation of messages for 
transmission must be user-friendly and allow the use of external 
message editors. 
11. Storage and Retrieval Support: System must have the capability to 
support storing messages after delivery to allow retrieval for such 
purposes as forwarding and resending and to support automated message 
handling functions. 
12. Distributions, Determination, and Delivery: System must provide 
the message originator with the capability to specify special 
handling and delivery instructions. It also must support single and 
multiple deliveries, as well as single address lists that result in 
multiple deliveries. 
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completely phased out and DMS fully implemented.  AUTODIN 
was originally scheduled to be phased out in 2000, however, 
its use continues because DMS cannot fully meet the system 
requirements of MROC 3-88.  Unfortunately, the funding for 
legacy systems (AUTODIN) will not continue beyond fiscal 
year 2011 (FY11).8  It is now imperative that DMS meet the 
system requirements outlined in MROC 3-88 and produce cost 
savings well before FY11. 
Recognizing the operational and fiscal challenges 
faced by naval messaging, the Commander, Fleet Forces 
Command initiated its change requirement in the Commander, 
Fleet Forces Command Message dated October 14, 2003 as 
discussed in Chapter II.  Note that many of the DMS system 
issues identified by the DOD IG report are also identified 
as system criteria by the Commander, Fleet Forces Command, 
primarily performance and security.    
B. ROLES OF CHANGE PARTICIPANTS 
Every member of an organization involved in business 
process reengineering or organizational change has a role.  
Change can only succeed if all members are active, involved 
and committed during the process of change.  Even the 
naysayers play a valuable part in the process.  They can 
illustrate the weaknesses of any change plan and recommend 
some of the best solutions for solving or mitigating them.  
For the purposes of our discussion, change participants 
fall into three broad action roles: change strategists, 
change implementors, and change recipients.9 
                     
8 As discussed with the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (U.S. 
Navy) during a phone conference in August 2006. 
9 Jick, Module 3, for more explanatory information on change agents 
and their roles.  
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The change strategists are those responsible for 
initiating the change.  They identify the need early on, 
create the vision and desired outcome, describe the extent 
of the change, select change sponsors, and defend the 
change requirement.  The Commander, Fleet Forces Command 
identified the need for a shift from the current naval 
messaging process, DMS, to a new naval messaging system.  
Their message clearly articulates their vision and desired 
outcome.  They described the extent of the change by 
identifying performance evaluation criteria of any proposed 
system.  The Naval Network Warfare Command was selected as 
the change sponsor who later created the NMWG which is 
responsible for the operational direction of the NREMS 
project.  Later, the NMWG restricted the extent of the 
change to an AMHS DMS core product implemented ashore only.  
Programmatically, the change is easy to defend for all of 
the reasons outlined in the DOD IG report as well as 
evidenced by the actual performance of DMS.  Culturally, 
however, the change is more difficult as will be discussed 
later in this chapter. 
Change implementors provide the bulk of the work in 
any change process.  Their efforts can make or break any 
change effort.  Change implementors manage the day to day 
process of change.  For the NREMS project, the Space and 
Naval Warfare Systems Command (U.S. Navy) is responsible 
for developing, updating and executing the implementation 
plan.  The Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (U.S. 
Navy) provides the day to day effort required to shape, 
enable, orchestrate and facilitate change progress.  
Without their efforts, the change could not progress. 
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Change recipients represent the largest group of 
people in any change endeavor.  Change recipients must 
adopt and adapt to the change.  If change recipients do not 
institutionalize the change, the change cannot successfully 
occur.  Instead, change recipients will revert to old 
habits either delaying the inevitable change or prohibiting 
the change from occurring at all.  Naval commands and 
registered naval messaging users who must adopt and adapt 
to NREMS are the change recipients of the NREMS project 
change endeavor.  Already at odds with DMS, this group of 
individuals will be the hardest group to commit to the 
transition from DMS to NREMS. 
During the NREMS project transition discussion, it is 
important to remember each of these roles and the 
responsibilities each has toward the success of the change. 
C. AN ANALYSIS OF THE NREMS PROJECT CHANGE MANAGEMENT 
APPROACH 
Jick’s Ten Commandments will form the framework of 
analysis for the change management approach of the NREMS 
project.  Therefore, a brief explanation of Jick’s Ten 
Commandments is appropriate.  Once explained, the salient 
points of the NREMS project transition plan will be 
discussed with respect to Jick’s framework.  The discussion 
will focus both on the strengths and weaknesses of the 
approach.  Chapter VII will provide the conclusions of the 
analysis. 
1. The Ten Commandments of Implementing Change 
The following section is provided to develop a common 
understanding of Jick’s Ten Commandments prior to analysis 
of the NREMS project.   
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a. Analyze the Organization and its Need for 
Change 
An organization, its structure and habits, must 
be fully understood before any change can occur.  Change 
strategists must understand a process’s current state, 
strengths and weaknesses before determining whether change 
is, in fact, necessary.   
b. Create a Shared Vision and Common Direction 
A central vision of any proposed change helps to 
unite the organization and focus their efforts toward 
change implementation.  The shared vision provides change 
participants with a destination or goal. 
c. Separate from the Past 
It is imperative that any organization disengage 
from past behavior, habits and routines that do not move 
the organization forward or inhibit it.  However, many find 
comfort in the known and predictable.  Develop reward 
systems that support desired behaviors and end states.  Do 
not reward old habits or routines that do not support the 
change endeavor. 
d. Create a Sense of Urgency 
One organizational change expert outlines two 
prerequisites for successful organizational change which 
are quoted below:10 
1.   Pain: a critical mass of information that 
justifies breaking from the status quo. 
2.   Remedy: desirable, accessible actions that would 
solve the problem or take advantage of the 
opportunity afforded the current situation. 
 
                     
10 Daryl R. Conner, Managing at the Speed of Change. New York: 
Villard Books, 1992, Chapter 6, for an explanation of the process of 
change. 
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It is this pain and the proposed remedy that 
create the sense of urgency required to initiate change 
momentum.  
e. Support a Strong Leader Role 
Change requires an inspirational leader to guide 
and drive change efforts, someone or some entity that 
effectively and enthusiastically advocates for and defends 
the change effort.  Without a strong leader, many change 
endeavors flounder and fail. 
f. Line Up Political Sponsorship 
Often, we misunderstand the term “political 
sponsorship.”  Political sponsorship not only refers to 
senior leadership, but all organizational members.  Who are 
the informal leaders of the process under transition?  Have 
they been included in the change process?   Did they 
participate in selecting the appropriate solution and 
developing the implementation plan?   
g. Craft an Implementation Plan 
The implementation plan is the framework and 
timeline required to implement change. It identifies roles, 
responsibilities, and activities/timelines required to 
implement the change.  It should be specific and detailed 
enough to be clear, but flexible enough to change as 
circumstances dictate.  It should be a living document that 
is continually revised as new information is made 
available, and successes and setbacks occur during the 
change process. 
h. Develop Enabling Structures 
Enabling structures are designed to spotlight and 
facilitate change.  These structures can include pilot 
tests, off-sight workshops, training programs and feedback 
mechanisms that support change.  The more complex the 
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change, the more thought out the enabling structures need 
to be to ensure that they support each other and are 
consistent with the vision of the change. 
i. Communicate, Involve People, and Be Honest 
All change participants should be made aware of 
the proposed change as soon as practically possible.  Care 
should be taken in how the change is introduced.  Do not 
gloss over the difficulties that can and will be faced.  As 
discussed in commandment four, focus on the necessity of 
the change and the benefits of the solution for the change 
recipient.   
j. Reinforce and Institutionalize Change 
Change is required for any organization to remain 
competitive in their field of endeavor.  Although we want 
to institutionalize the changed process, we truly need to 
institutionalize a culture receptive to change.  These 
cultures more readily institutionalize new systems and 
processes and view change as a positive and important 
endeavor that sustains the organization and helps it 
proliferate.   
2. Analysis 
It is not necessary to address all Ten Commandments 
when analyzing any change endeavor.  The Ten Commandments 
are meant simply to be a guideline, not a roadmap for 
success.  With this in mind, this section will address some 
of the more salient characteristics of the reference 
framework as they apply to the NREMS project.  
Although we fully understand the limitations, 
strengths and weaknesses of DMS, we do not fully understand 
the actual architectural structure of DMS in the Navy.  No 
clear inventory or system diagrams exist to paint a picture 
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of how DMS software and hardware have been implemented at 
the organizational level.  One individual at the Naval 
Computer and Telecommunications Area Master Station, 
Atlantic indicated that any past survey efforts have met 
with lackluster results.  Either naval messaging 
organizations don’t know what they have or do not have the 
resources to clearly articulate their assets.  The current 
NREMS implementation plan is based on an educated guess of 
the assets that exist.  As with past change efforts from 
AUTODIN to DMS, or NMCI, the lack of knowledge about actual 
assets can be very problematic resulting in time delays and 
additional resources.  It can also result in significant 
change recipient push back as roadblocks are encountered 
when the lack of understanding of the current system and 
structure become evident.   
SPAWAR understands this weakness and has plans in 
place to help mitigate any potential problems down the 
road.  The change will occur in the Pacific Theater first 
before it moves into the Atlantic theater.  Smaller 
commands are targeted to transition first so that bandwidth 
can be monitored and potential problems with existing 
systems and infrastructure can be managed in a more 
controlled environment.  As problems are encountered, time 
will be taken to identify appropriate solutions before 
moving forward.  A command can be easily shifted back to 
DMS until issues are resolved minimizing impact to the 
messaging capabilities of that command.  No more than one 
command should be affected at any one time.  Because the 
NREMS project is simply a shift from a client-server based 
DMS to a web-enabled DMS system, the issues encountered 
should be minimal. 
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Commander, Fleet Forces Command set forth a clear 
vision in their October 2003 message and the Naval Network 
Warfare Command, the NMWG and the Space and Naval Warfare 
Systems Command (U.S. Navy) have developed an 
implementation plan that achieves this vision.  However, 
few change recipients are aware of the message or the 
vision.  Even fewer understand the difference between DMS 
and NREMS. 
At one command we visited, a registered naval 
messaging user had no idea what NREMS was or that a 
transition would be occurring within naval messaging.  
Significant resources are available on the naval messaging 
website that outline NREMS and provide training for AMHS.  
However, he was completely unaware of NREMS, its vision or 
its benefits to his command like reduced maintenance 
requirements.  When introduced to the NREMS project, he 
immediately became skeptical of any need for change.  With 
little knowledge of NREMS, he was already resistant to the 
idea of NREMS.   
Although AUTODIN is antiquated and aging, it works and 
still performs functions that DMS cannot.  Organizations 
were, and still are, resistant to letting it go.  “If it’s 
not broke, don’t fix it.”  Few are aware of the costs and 
limitations associated with maintaining this system.  Even 
fewer are aware of the benefits of implementing NREMS vs. 
AUTODIN or DMS.   
In order for change to be effective, we must reinforce 
those behaviors and actions that we desire, i.e., 
transitioning to NREMS.  Instead, we reward individuals who 
will maintain a naval messaging capability whether with 
AUTODIN, DMS, NREMS or any method that allows messages to 
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be successfully sent and received.  As anecdotal evidence I 
present an example presented to me by the Projects Officer 
(N5) at NCTS Puerto Rico during the transition from AUTODIN 
to DMS: 
NCTS Puerto Rico was ordered to transition from 
AUTODIN to DMS.  However, the Naval Computer and 
Telecommunications Station, Puerto Rico did not 
have the infrastructure to support the 
transition.  Because this mandate was urgent, she 
developed workarounds in order to implement DMS.  
The goal of DMS, however, was standardization of 
DOD messaging hardware and software.  The 
standard hardware and software architecture could 
not be implemented because the infrastructure at 
NCTS Puerto Rico could not support the bandwidth 
requirements of DMS.  Additional hardware, not 
specified by the DMS program, was purchased to 
allow NCTS Puerto Rico to communicate with other 
DMS activities.  In spite of the non-standard 
implementation of DMS, the Projects Officer 
received an award for implementing DMS on 
schedule and within budget.   
Members of Navy organization are routinely rewarded 
for behaviors that are not consistent with the vision of 
most change efforts.  Successfully completing a mission is 
considered more important than the method used to complete 
it.  It is difficult to successfully move forward while 
rewarding past bad behavior.  Do we have an appropriate 
reward system in place to support the transition from DMS 
to NREMS?  What behaviors should be rewarded? 
Most change participants (change strategists and 
change implementors) from the Commander, Fleet Forces 
Command to the NMWG and the Space and Naval Warfare Systems 
Command (U.S. Navy) feel the pain induced by the 
inadequacies of DMS to meet the Navy’s needs and the fiscal 
burden of maintaining legacy systems in conjunction with 
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DMS.  They also understand the rewards of the remedy: 
decreased maintenance costs and requirements, decreased 
manpower requirements, consistent configuration 
implementation, and a reduced number of assets required to 
operate NREMS.   
Navy organizational messaging commands (change 
recipients) only understand the pain they endured during 
the transition from AUTODIN to DMS with the proposed 
transition from DMS to NREMS coming down the road.  In 
numerous discussions, we heard the question, “Why are we 
transitioning again when we couldn’t get DMS to work?”  
Change recipients do not perceive the same pain as change 
strategists and change implementors, nor are they aware of 
the rewards of the remedy.  The available literature 
outlines the structure of NREMS, not the requirement for it 
or the benefits of the transition. 
The NREMS project included both a test lab at the 
Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (U.S. Navy), San 
Diego and a pilot site at the Naval Computer and 
Telecommunications Station, Far East.  AMHS was tested in a 
lab environment before fielding at the test site.  Care was 
taken to ensure that NREMS had the same look and feel as 
DMS.  The browsers are virtually identical with minor 
differences that are easily navigated.  Issues discovered 
during the test pilot were brought back to the testing lab 
for verification and resolution.   
The NMWG has planned a significant training program 
for NREMS users.  Personnel at both messaging centers will 
receive in-class training.  NREMS CMAs and users can 
register for on-line courses that will be made available.  
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As commands transition, experts will be present to provide 
initial orientation and ad hoc training as required.  
With the exception of the pilot project at the Naval 
Computer and Telecommunications Station, Far East, no 
significant feedback system is in place.  While visiting 
the testing lab in San Diego in March 2007, the question 
was posed, “How do I comment on AMHS, ask questions or 
provide input once I’ve visited the website?”  At that 
time, no formal feedback system existed.  A help menu was 
available, but could not address unique or specific 
questions.  It provided general knowledge only.  This can 
easily be remedied by simply providing a link to an email 
address for feedback submission.  However, it is extremely 
important to provide change recipients with an effective 
feedback mechanism.  This simple change requirement cannot 
be overlooked. 
Change recipients’ are still reeling from the effects 
of the transition from AUTODIN to DMS.  It will take 
significant communication to convince them of the need to 
transition from DMS to NREMS.  Communicate the change in a 
manner that speaks to the change recipient, i.e., 
maintenance and upkeep will shift from the command to the 
message center with a web-enabled messaging system, fewer 
resources will be required by commands to maintain the 
messaging capability, etc.  Address issues that are of 
concern to the change recipient.  Keep in mind that change 
recipients’ issues may not be the same as the issues 
concerning change strategists and change implementors.     
No change solution will please everyone.  However, if 
change recipients understand the strengths, weaknesses and 
resource limitations (i.e., funding constraints, available 
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technology, federal guidelines/mandates, etc.) of the 
solution, they are more likely to commit to the change and 
institutionalize it.  
As mentioned previously, extensive literature is 
available on the naval messaging website about NREMS.  The 
literature does not include information that would help to 
create a sense of urgency among change recipients.  It is 
also unclear how extensively it is accessed. 
Initially, the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command 
(U.S. Navy) had planned a “road show” to introduce the 
NREMS transition, answer questions, and provide an informal 
feedback mechanism.  Unfortunately, limited resources have 
forced the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (U.S. 
Navy) to cancel this effort.  Studies have shown that 
implementation shortcomings include:11 
 Failing to win adequate support for change. 
 Neglecting to involve all those who will be 
affected by change. 
 Dismissing complaints outright, instead of taking 
the time to judge their possible validity. 
The funds expended initially to conduct the road show 
may actually mitigate the long term cost of not gaining 
initial change recipient support.  Change recipient push 
back can cause extensive implementation delays and 
expenditure of a large amount of resources.  A thorough 
risk analysis should be conducted to analyze the potential 
impact of change recipient push back.  Are the costs 
associated less than the cost of a road show? 
The shift from DMS to NREMS will not require 
significant business process reengineering.  Change 
                     
11 Jick, Module 3, for more details of the study. 
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recipients will perform the same functions within NREMS as 
with DMS, only with less effort because of the transition 
to a web-enabled system, less hardware and software 
requires less maintenance and resources.  If made aware of 
the benefits of the transition, it is expected that the 
benefits should be sufficient to institutionalize the 
change.  Without this knowledge, change recipients will not 
be receptive initially and can delay implementation 
efforts.  Skepticism is only overcome by sufficient 
information and contextual knowledge.  
D. CONCLUSION 
The NREMS Project fulfills many of the requirements 
for a successful change endeavor:  a vision with a common 
direction, a sense of urgency (among change strategists and 
change implementors), a thorough implementation plan, a 
strong leader role (the NMWG guides implementors) and 
enabling structures.  However, there is a significant gap 
between change strategists/implementors and change 
recipients.   
Kirkpatrick defines three keys to a successful change:  
empathy, communication and participation.12  Surprisingly, 
each of these keys are with respect to change recipients.  
Strategists initiate and guide the change, implementors 
execute the change, but recipients institutionalize the 
change.  It is imperative that change recipients are 
adequately informed, involved, and provided appropriate 
feedback mechanisms as early as possible.  Too often, 
change recipients are made aware of the transition as it 
occurs.  This creates unnecessary anxiety and confusion 
                     
12 Donald L. Kirkpatrick, How to Manage Change Effectively. San 
Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1985, Chapters 6-9, for a more thorough 
explanation of each key. 
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even for the most valid change endeavors.  Gaining 
recipient commitment will require more resources and 
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IV. REVIEW OF NAVAL MESSAGING ARCHITECTURE 
The Naval messaging architecture forms the 
informational basis for the Navy’s requirements for 
organizational message traffic and the systems of choice to 
satisfy these needs.  In this chapter both the DMS and 
NREMS messaging architecture will be reviewed with regard 
to four critical factors: strategic concept, operational 
requirements, problem characterization, and analysis of the 
architecture.  Section 1 will introduce the strategic 
concept each architecture supports for DOD electronic 
messaging.  The operational requirements, section 2, will 
be summarized into the proposed operational goals for the 
success of each system. DMS and NREMS technical, 
operational, and cost issues will be outlined for further 
review in section 3.  Finally, section 4 will end the 
chapter with the summarized analysis of the architectural 
guidance for the systems.   
A. DEFENSE MESSAGING SYSTEM (DMS) 
The Defense Message System (DMS) is now the DOD’s 
system of record for handling organizational messages13 
(DISA 2006). Because of their official and often critical 
nature, organizational messages place specific operational 
requirements on communications systems such as high level 
security, precedence, timely delivery, and high 
availability and reliability. DISA initially planned to 
implement DMS on over 360,000 desk-top computers at over 
7,000 sites worldwide (i.e., tactical forces, allies, 
Federal Government users, and defense contractors).  
                     
13 Organizational messages are messages and other communications 
exchanged between organizational elements in support of command and 
control (C2), combat support, combat service support, and other 
functional activities. 
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Ultimately, the goal of DISA was to extend DMS to over 
2,000,000 desktops to provide ordinary email and 
"individual" messaging using commercial off the shelf 
standards and technology (DOT&E 1997). 
1. Strategic Concept 
DMS is structured to provide an interoperable, 
seamless, and secure electronic messaging system for 
organizational users within the Department of Defense. DMS 
uses commercial products for drafting, coordinating, and 
releasing messages.  The system design architecture used to 
develop DMS provides a flexible framework that is 
positioned to support evolving requirements (e.g., a 
modified set of required operational messaging 
characteristics), a design that is collaborative computing 
centric, and an implementation that provides both 
acquisition and life cycle cost reductions.  This 
architecture supports the key DMS design tenet: a single 
messaging solution for DOD electronic messaging (LMC 2004). 
The Target Architecture and Implementation Strategy 
TAIS) describes DMS as an evolutionary (incremental 
development strategy employed) that engages a joint DOD 
process to coordinate requirements, architecture, policies, 
standards, funding and acquisitions.  Using a phased 
development plan for the transition, the strategic aim is 
for the DMS architecture to achieve near-term cost and 
personnel savings while enhancing DOD’s messaging 
capability through a jointly-developed (cross-Service and 





2. Operational Requirements 
The Multicommand Required Operational Capability 
(MROC) 3-88 Change 2 outlines several operational goals for 
DMS to achieve as a system. DMS should:  
a. Provide message service to all DOD, and interface 
with other U.S. Government agencies, allied 
countries, defense contractors and other 
authorized users (e.g., academia).  
b. Process and protect all unclassified, classified, 
and sensitive message traffic at all levels and 
compartments based upon integrity, 
authentication, and confidentiality. 
c. Provide standardization and interoperability, 
while preserving adaptability to implement 
Service and agency unique functions. 
d. Be backward compatible with the AUTODIN system 
(including base-level support systems) and the 
electronic mail systems on the DOD Internet. 
e. Support a guaranteed secure and timely delivery 
of organizational message traffic, based upon 
precedence, to its intended recipient; with 
prompt notification of non-delivery. 
f. Adapt to changes in users capacity, component 
upgrades, connectivity and message throughput 
without major redesign or steep user learning 
curves, while preserving the ability to implement 
Service and agency unique functions. 
These capabilities are expected to promote a messaging 
system superior to Automatic Digital Network (AUTODIN) 
toward contributing to information superiority. 
Specifically, the MROC 3-88 defines 12 general 
operational requirements for DMS to address in its 
messaging function: 
1. Connectivity/Interoperability 
2. Message Delivery 
3. Timely Delivery 
4. Confidentiality/Security 
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9. Identification of Recipients 
10. Message Preparation Support 
11. Storage Retrieval 
12. Distribution Determination and Delivery. 
In this research, the operational goals and the 
messaging characteristics established by the MROC 3-88 
Change 2 will be reconciled to help assess the critical 
quality attributes that significantly contribute to the 
success or failure of the system.  
3. Problem Characterization 
The expected outcome from implementing the DMS system 
is to reduce cost and staffing by eliminating the outdated 
and expensive AUTODIN system. This earlier system was 
implemented in 1962 to provide DOD secure and reliable 
transmission of organizational messages.  In a late 1980s 
study, the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) 
concluded that AUTODIN was inflexible, outdated and costing 
in excess of $700 million per year to operate (NCS 2000).  
To reduce costs, DMS was expected to fulfill the tactical 
and allied messaging role by using available commercial 
products and incorporate industry standards.  
According to the results of independent operational 
tests conducted by the Joint Interoperability Test Center 
(JITC), DMS Release 2.2 (April 2001) did not fully meet 
four of the 12 MROC requirements: confidentiality/security, 
message delivery, integrity, and availability/reliability. 
The release of DMS 3.0 (June 2002) was developed to satisfy 
these MROC requirements and with continued product 
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improvements these shortfalls are becoming less relevant to 
DMS success, according to the JITC (2002) testing 
completed.   
The most costly problems of the system appear to be 
maintenance and support.  The DMS architecture uses a 
client-server model based on Microsoft Exchange and the 
Outlook client, the client-server model has posed problems 
for the system.  A white paper proposing an alternative 
solution, “Background of the Naval Regional Message System 
(NREMS),” suggest the following DMS limitations:  
a. DMS Client Maintenance 
In addition to customer problems, the client 
maintenance complexity has created a greater support burden 
for the DMS program than desired.  The DMS client requires 
regular and sometimes complex patches / configuration 
updates.   
b. FORTEZZA Logistics 
Considerable logistical coordination is also 
required to distribute and maintain the FORTEZZA cards14 
required for operation with the DMS client software. 
4. Analysis of Architectural Guidance 
From the earliest development phase, DMS has used an 
architectural design approach.  This specific approach 
addresses the operational requirements previously 
presented, but also considered important aspects needed in 
the overarching DMS architecture. The following is a  
 
 
                     
14 Fortezza cards are Personal Computer Memory Card International 
Association (PCMCIA) card that provides high assurance cryptographic 
services to DMS applications.  These cards are rugged, credit card-size 
peripherals that add security and authentication capabilities to 
computers (CMS-9). 
40 
summary of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
Instruction (CJCSI) 5721.01C established minimum 
architectural criteria, DMS should:  
a. Promote interoperability with previous versions 
of DMS and other messaging systems.  
b. Be extensible by supporting multi-location 
groupware designs that take advantage of 
capabilities in commercially available 
collaborative computing products.   
c. Be scalable toward future improvements that 
prevent product limitations from negatively 
impacting system reliability, scalability, 
security, and performance. 
d. Reduce the cost to operate, manage, and support 
the fielded system. 
B. NAVY REGIONAL ENTERPRISE MESSAGING SYSTEM (NREMS) 
The Navy Regional Enterprise Messaging System (NREMS) 
is an enhancement to the Defense Message System (DMS) 
architecture.  NREMS will provide the capability for ashore 
users to send and receive DMS messages using a web browser.  
NREMS will eliminate the need for possessing DMS FORTEZZA 
cards by the end users and eliminate the very often and 
sometimes complex software patches and configuration 
updates at the end user site.  With the implementation of 
NREMS, the Navy seeks access to reliable, decision-quality 
organizational messaging through network-based messaging 
services. 
1. Strategic Concept 
The strategic concept is a centralized Navy DMS 
messaging architecture operating through regional messaging 
centers, which profile messages for customer commands, 
manage FORTEZZA cards, work non delivery notice (NDN) 
issues, and provide training and assistance as required. An 
enterprise solution will mitigate existing DMS operations 
and maintenance issues by eliminating client software, and 
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consolidating FORTEZZA cards, Navy DMS messaging and its 
expertise at the regional sites.  The end state will move 
complex messaging tasks from non-information technology 
personnel to trained messaging professionals, and will 
allow a reduction in the number of local control centers 
(LCC’s) and regional server sites (RSS’s).  This presents 
an opportunity to mitigate issues with DMS installation, 
operations and maintenance, and to improve governance, 
performance, security and cost.  Implementation of NREMS 
will allow the Navy to consolidate to a two (2) site 
Regional Navy Operational Service Center (RNOSC) from the 
current eight (8) DMS Service Provider (DSP) sites. 
NAVNETWARCOM (NNWC) plans to implement NREMS at NCTAMS PAC 
(Wahiawa, HI) and NCTAMS LANT (Norfolk, VA) with full 
failover between these sites (COMNAVNETWARCOM 152158Z DEC 
04).  NREMS provides an enabler for Network Centric 
Enterprise Services (NCES) in support of the Global 
Information Grid Enterprise Services (GIG-ES) (PEO C4I 
2005). 
2. Operational Requirements 
In response to DMS problems characterized within 
section A.3 of this chapter, Commander, Fleet Forces 
Command released a message requesting the Navy to evaluate 
the Automated Message Handling System (AMHS) as a standard 
Navy enterprise DMS messaging solution (Commander, Fleet 
Forces Command 221414Z OCT 03).  The primary basis for the 
NREMS requirements continue to stem from the MROC 3-88 
Change 2 but defines organizational messaging requirements 
based upon a standard enterprise messaging solution for 
medium to large commands.  The messaging community 
recommended consolidating the existing messaging 
infrastructure and web-enabling DMS messaging.  The AMHS, a 
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product suite developed by the Telos Corporation, was 
selected for implementation.  The Telos AMHS is part of the 
jointly tested and supported DMS core baseline set of 
products. The technology is mature and has been developed 
and tested by DISA and used with organizations such as 
Combatant Commanders (COCOMs) i.e., PACOM.  NREMS presents 
an opportunity to re-architect DMS in order to resolve 
installation, operations and maintenance issues.  The AMHS 
Operational Concept Document suggests that with the use of 
the CP-XP/Telos AMHS (and Domain FORTEZZA) the following 
functional advances can be realized: 
a.  Relieve the end user of the requirement to 
maintain the DMS User Agent (UA) client 
workstation. 
b.  Centralize the FORTEZZA function (the user would 
no longer hold the FORTEZZA card). 
c.  Centralize DMS systems management to a reduced 
quantity of sites (down from the 20+ area 
communication centers (ACC) and local 
communication centers (LCC) to six sites or 
less). 
d.  Web enable all processes of message management 
including reading, sending, archiving, 
retrospective search, and account management. 
e.  Empower the Navy to outsource basic systems 
management functions to a contractor. 
3. Problem Characterization 
While NREMS should resolve DMS issues such as site 
maintenance and FORTEZZA logistical dilemmas, it is not 
without its program shortfalls.  NREMS problems are 
epitomized by various technology performance and costs 
constraints that are success factors (PEO C4I 2005).  They 




a. NMCI Connectivity 
The Navy has directed contractor owned/government 
operated regional Automatic Message Handling Systems (AMHS) 
that leverage existing contract vehicles and NMCI 
infrastructure and aligns with emerging NCES standards 
(COMNAVNETWARCOM 101644Z May 04).  NMCI must be prepared to 
provide sufficient connectivity, bandwidth and network 
services to support NREMS. 
b. DOD PKI Availability 
Implementation of AMHS requires system functions 
and associated proxy-release policy that permits a web 
browser-based user to send a message from Microsoft 
Internet Explore (IE).  Some form of security must be 
implemented to ensure authenticity, integrity and 
confidentiality for DOD messaging is maintained.  DOD PKI 
can be successfully exploited for use within the Sensitive 
But Unclassified (SBU) messaging environment, however PKI 
is not well established in the SECRET messaging domain and 
completely lacking in the Top Secret/Collateral (TS/C) 
messaging domain. 
c. Multi-user Capability 
AMHS software must address user scalability and 
support the 2 RNOSC concept.  The capability to handle 
thousands of messaging users simultaneously during peace 
and wartime traffic loads is a mandatory function for the 
AMHS.  Currently the “stress test”   to ascertain the 
maximum user and message generation capacity thresholds has 
not been conducted.  
d.  CP-XP Service Restart Time 
A re-caching (or revalidation) of stored 
certifications is performed by this “service” and, based on 
the number of unique credentials hosted by a particular 
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AMHS server, can be an operation preventing timely and full 
return-to-service of the AMHS overall. 
 
4. Analysis of Architectural Guidance 
The NREMS planning initiative seeks to transform Naval 
messaging into a full IP based capability providing access 
to record message traffic from anywhere at anytime. In 
order to maintain the same level of service to the fleet, 
technology investments must be made that will provide the 
foundation for future transformational communications 
architectures.  NREMS is a web based service to meet OSD 
mandated Defense Messaging System Requirement.  NREMS 
replaces DMS MS Exchange/Outlook products and many legacy 
products.  NREMS should provide: 
a. Fully joint and allied interoperable messaging 
capability.      
b. Availability to a secure web based message search 
capability, with minimal disruption of services, 
to replace myriad command unique message handling 
systems. 
c. A system scalable to large-scale enterprise 
deployment while maintaining full user 
capabilities; secure reader, drafter, and 
releaser functionality during peace and wartime 
operational messaging volumes. 
d. Regional networked product maintainability and 
manageability for mandatory software and security 
upgrades.  
The discussion of the four critical factors: strategic 
concept, operational requirements, problem 
characterization, and analysis of the architecture provides 
the functional analysis and operational basis for the Naval 
messaging construct. Despite the architectural differences 
(client-server vs. network model) the core architectural 
guidance remains the same.  The following chapter will 
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introduce the research methodologies employed to assist in 
analyzing the DMS to NREMS architecture implementation.  
Both architectural analysis and business process re-
engineering techniques will be used to examine how well the 
planned architecture satisfies MROC requirements and the 
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V. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Since the migration of DOD messaging to the DMS has 
been mandated, implementation has been less than ideal and 
otherwise unsuccessful.  DMS users have reported 
dissatisfaction with the systems maintenance and security 
support burdens in the current client-server model (DODIG 
2003).  NREMS introduces a networked environment capable of 
push technology and centralized database and security 
management which should significantly reduce the DMS 
shortfalls that have made the system lack appeal to the end 
user.  As the DOD seeks to solve these issues, other 
potential issues are introduced that must be reviewed and 
addressed to ensure a successful implementation of the 
NREMS.  
Two methods were used in this thesis research.  The 
Architecture Trade-off Analysis Method (ATAM) and user 
surveys formed the basis for analysis, conclusions, and 
recommendations. The goal of the ATAM is to understand the 
current message system, DMS and the consequences of 
architectural decisions with respect to the quality 
attribute requirements of the new messaging system 
(Clements et al., 2000, p. 1).  User surveys provided the 
data to characterize the current naval messaging business 
process for each naval command and across the Navy with the 
prospect of properly defining future NREMS users. Combined 
analysis provided a clear expectation for the alternative 





A. ARCHITECTURE TRADE-OFF ANALYSIS METHOD (ATAM) 
A system is driven by both functional and quality 
goals. The architecture is the key to achieving—or failing 
to achieve—these goals.  The ATAM not only reveals an 
architecture’s ability to satisfy these particular quality 
goals but also provides insight into the how the quality 
goals interact with each, hence the name trade-off analysis 
method.  The ATAM is a nine step process separated into 
four groups/phases: presentation, investigation and 
analysis, testing, and reporting (Clements et al., 2002, p. 
39).  Presentation begins the process with the exchange of 
information. Investigation and analysis assess the key 
quality attribute requirements based upon the architectural 
approach.  Testing checks the result of the analysis 
against the stakeholder needs.  Finally, the reporting 
phase presents the results of the ATAM to the appropriate 
stakeholders.    
This ATAM evaluation will expose architectural risks 
that potentially inhibit the achievement of an 
organization’s business and mission goals (Bass et al., 
2006).  This will be accomplished by evaluating the system 
architecture relative to its system components and quality 
attribute goals such as security and maintainability.  In 
addition to discovering how well the architecture satisfies 
quality goals a map of how these quality attributes 
interact with each will be presented.  In the absence of 
system stakeholders and direct access to a test and 
evaluation center, only the presentation, the investigation 
and analysis phase of the ATAM were accomplished for the 
NREMS architecture (Clements et al., 2002, pp. 44-45). 
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An abundance of available literature (Bass, Clements) 
and test results currently exist to address the functional, 
operational, and architectural requirements of DMS. DMS 
projects have received a high priority from Office of the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, 
Communications and Intelligence (OASD/C3I) in terms of 
funding support, since inception, because of its critical 
importance to defense messaging (DMSAWG, 1990). With top-
down support, DMS has evolved to introduce new capabilities 
and expand to meet MROC 3-88 requirements.   
NREMS, unlike DMS, is not a program of record and 
lacks the personnel and funding support afforded the DMS 
program.  NREMS is solely based upon the requirements set 
by the DMS MROC 3-88 requirements with featured 
enhancements to reduce the costs associated with the 
maintenance and support of the DMS.  This analysis will 
begin with an analysis of the DMS architecture as a frame 
of reference then attempt to perform and in-depth analysis 
of the NREMS architecture to determine whether the system 
is capable of meeting the previously discussed DMS MROC 3-
88 requirements within the desired web-based architectural 
environment.  
B. USER SURVEYS 
The survey was disseminated to all users registered 
with the Navy Regional Messaging website (see Figure 1).  
The sample collected from this population was used to 
statistically characterize naval messaging requirements, 
i.e., fully web-enabled messaging with only thin clients on 




Distribution System (DMDS) locally, or a combination of 
both.  Resources can then be properly allocated and planned 
to support the transition from DMS to NREMS. 
Little is currently known about end user naval 
messaging business processes.  During the transition 
planning from DMS to NREMS, naval messages were 
disseminated to naval organizations through NETWARCOM 
requiring feedback by a due date.  Past solicitation of end 
user requirements and system components have generated 
lackluster response.  The transition from DMS to NREMS was 
planned utilizing educated guesses of end user requirements 
of the naval messaging system.  True data and system 
inventories do not exist in any easily accessible database.   
In conjunction with the Space and Naval Warfare 
Systems Command, six end user business processes were 
defined and characterized in Figure 2.  The questions in 
the survey were crafted to navigate the decision tree and 
select a specific business process for each respondent 
(Appendix A).  The aggregate of responses was used to 
characterize the complete business model for naval 
messaging by determining the percentage of each type of 
business process present and extrapolating across the 
entire enterprise.  Additional questions were included in 
the survey that were not relevant to the business process 
decision tree, but were of interest to SPAWARSYSCOM. 
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Figure 3.   Naval Messaging Business Process Decision Tree (From: SAIC-PEO C4I PMW 160.3) 
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VI. RESEARCH ANALYSIS 
With the emergence of the Internet, and subsequently 
the Web, messaging now affects business efficiency and 
competitiveness such that it has become a mission-critical 
part of enterprise systems. Because messaging is such a 
fundamental feature for many application architectures, 
poor choices can have disastrous consequences, affecting 
performance, scalability, availability, and ultimately user 
acceptance.  
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the DMS 
architecture will serve purely as a frame of reference for 
the NREMS implementation within this thesis.  The Defense 
Message System Target Architecture and Implementation 
Strategy can be used for a more in-depth analysis of the 
DMS architecture.  This thesis will focus the analysis on 
the additive advantages that NREMS introduces to the DOD as 
well as introduce architecture and business process 
shortfalls that could result in a program failure.  It will 
also provide more detailed information about the current 
structure of naval messaging and the ideal end state for 
naval messaging organizations after transition to NREMS. 
A. DMS ARCHITECTURE ANALYSIS 
In preparation for the architectural evaluation, the 
system is first broken down or presented as individual 
components and described within the context of each one as 
an element of the architecture.  The current DMS 
client/server architecture is based on Microsoft Outlook 




1. Message Handling Services (MHS) 
The DMS MHS provides the core capability for military 
messaging. The X.400 Message Handling System (MHS) consists 
of two subsystems: The core MHS (i.e., those components 
needed to originate, transmit, receive, and store messages) 
and specialty products that provide message distribution 
determination, interoperability with AUTODIN, address list 
expansion, and interoperability between users on disparate 
secure networks.  It also contains a special directory used 
to provide centralized message routing management.   
2. Directory Services (DS) 
DS supports DMS by providing naming, addressing and 
contact information for messaging. The X.500 Directory 
System consists of the Directory System Agent (DSA) that 
hosts its information, applications that access the 
directory, and an administrative application for directory 
maintenance.   
3. Security Services (SS) 
DMS security services integrated throughout the system 
provides the traditional services of integrity, 
confidentiality, non-repudiation, access control, and 
authentication.  The DMS Security Policy dictates that all 
organizational messages will be signed and encrypted within 
DMS, automatically providing authenticity, non-repudiation 
and integrity (via signature), and confidentiality and 
access control (via encryption). 
4. Interoperability Services (IS) 
DMS interacts with legacy users via a Multi-Function 
Interpreter (MFI) and interacts with other e-mail systems 
via an SMTP gateway at the groupware server. The MFI is the 
only component that allows messages to be exchanged between  
 
55 
legacy users (JANAP 128) users and DMS users. 
Infrastructure MFIs are placed at the National Gateway 
Center.  
In addition to the primary architectural elements, the 
DMS backbone infrastructure operates in conjunction with 
the existing Defense Information Systems Network (DISN). 
The DMS architecture provides a framework for a 
Service/Agency implementation and a managed backbone 
infrastructure to plug into.  The architecture does not 
limit an organization to design in terms of a “site,” 
referring to a specific geographic location. It is largely 
distinguished by its role in the DISN, which participates 
in the underlying network transport infrastructure. DISN 
also provides a Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) base 
with which DMS will coexist. The backbone infrastructure 
topology and a functional view of the DMS architecture are 



















Figure 4.   DMS Architecture (Functional View) 
 
B. NREMS ARCHITECTURE ANALYSIS 
DMS will evolve from a user agent (UA)-client to the 
internet explorer (IE)-client for messaging with the AMHS 
and will cause a significant change in command level 
business processes.  OSD mandated the way ahead for DMS 
Expanded Boundary Solution-Navy (DEBS-N) approach that will 
consist of centralized messaging and FORTEZZA security 
services using a domain FORTEZZA approach. Fundamentally, 
the overall DMS architecture at the backbone level will 
remain the same, although consolidation is expected over 
time (SPAWAR 2006). The most significant change will be at 
the DMS site level.  The NREMS server will replace the 
dedicated DMS Exchange server at the DMS Service Provider 
(DSP) and the UA will not be required. To conduct 
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messaging, customers will use their desktop web browser and 
DOD Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) credentials. FORTEZZA 
credentials will remain with the AMHS. The AMHS is 
comprised primarily of two independent programs running on 
the same computer.  During DMS functions, the programs 
become interdependent (SPAWAR 2004). 
1. CommPower CP-XP 
A software application on the AMHS computer that 
interacts internally with the FORTEZZA card to decrypt 
incoming DMS traffic or to sign and encrypt outbound DMS 
traffic. 
Externally, the CP-XP application communicates (via 
the X.400 protocol) the P1 formatted DMS message to and 
from Message Transfer Agent (MTAs) either in the DISA DMS 
backbone or with other AMHSs. 
Internally, for inbound or outbound processes, the CP-
XP interacts with the AMHS via the Extensible Markup 
Language15 (XML) standard.  Communication is in the “clear” 
(not encrypted during transit), but the XML in the clear is 
strictly internal to the computer, therefore it does not 
transverse an environment subject to compromise, such as a 
local area network (LAN). 
2. Telos AMHS 
A software application for the actual AMHS component.  
The code uses commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) utilities to 
achieve its purpose: 
 user interfaces with the AMHS computer’s 
Microsoft Internet Information Services (MS IIS) 
web interface, and 
                     
15 Extensible Markup Language (XML) is a general-purpose markup 
language. Its primary purpose is to facilitate the sharing of data 
across different information systems, particularly via the Internet. 
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 DMS messages are stored on the AMHS computer 
using the Verity database manager application. 
The AMHS concept centralizes the storage and access 
method for DOD messaging.  This is a completely new concept 
compared with the current distributed messaging system.  
User’s access will be granted via web browser rather than 
Microsoft Outlook and the administrative and maintenance 
burden will shift to regional sites. This should greatly 
minimize the need for messaging support personnel at 
individual commands (see Figure 5). 
 
 
Figure 5.   NREMS Architecture (Operational View) (From: 
PEO C4I 2005) 
 
C. QUALITY ATTRIBUTES 
Despite the abundance of DMS literature, explicit 
mention of the architectures quality attributes were 
surprisingly absent from the documentation.  In absence of 
expressed quality attributes, the goal then became to 
focus, using discretion, on the underling areas of quality 
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interest that seemed to be emphasized the most across the 
DMS documents that were reviewed. Drawing from the 
requirements and description of the DMS architecture 
previously described; several quality attributes emerged 
implicitly to become relevant for the NREMS evaluation.  
Security, performance, availability, scalability and 
maintainability/supportability were determined to be the 
”highest-priority” quality attributes impacting the 
requirements described in Chapter III.  
Clements et al. defines the following quality 
attributes chosen for the NREMS analysis. 
 Security.  Protection of system data against 
disclosure, modification, or destruction. 
Protection of computer systems themselves both 
technical and administrative. 
 Performance.  The ability of the system to 
allocate its computational resources to requests 
for service in a manner that will satisfy timing 
requirements; i.e., critical messages. 
 Availability/Reliability.  The long-term 
proportion of time the system is working and 
delivering its services. Availability and 
reliability are closely related. 
 Scalability.  The ability of a system to support 
the desired quality of service as load increases 
without having to change the system. 
 Maintainability/Supportability.  Maintainability 
is the efficiency and ease of monitoring and 
maintaining the system in order to keep the 
system performing, secure and running smoothly. 
Supportability is the effective means to keep the 
system running after deployment based on 
resources including both knowledgeable and 
available technical staff.  Successful 
maintenance requires support. 
Quality requirements can be categorized as either 
development or operational.  Development quality 
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requirements are qualities of the system that are relevant 
from an engineering perspective, such as maintainability.  
Operational quality requirements are qualities of the 
system, such as performance and reliability (Bosch 2000 p. 
27).  
Throughout the quality attribute analysis performance 
will be referenced often.  This is due to the impact 
various attributes may have on a systems overall operation.  
For example, the level of confidentiality required in a 
virtual private network might be sensitive to the number of 
bits chosen for encryption.  In this case, confidentiality 
would be a sensitivity point and an architect may have to 
trade-off a performance characteristic such as increased 
latency to ensure that confidentiality is maintained.  At 
every decision point architects are faced with vices such 
as these this analysis sensitivity and trade-off points 
will be further explained throughout the thesis.     
1. Security 
Security is an essential quality attribute of most DOD 
systems but there has always been a particular focus in 
reference to communications systems.  The MROC 3-88 
specifically addresses three DMS security requirements that 
must carry-over to NREMS in order to ensure the security of 
the networked system; specifically, confidentiality, 
integrity, and authentication. Confidentiality refers to 
keeping the data private, so only authorized users can view 
it.  Integrity means ensuring that measures are taken so 
the data cannot be changed, unless by an authorized user.  
All DoD Services are migrating to the domain FORTEZZA 
approach, which is endorsed by the Office of the Secretary 
of Defense (OSD) and DISA as the way ahead for DMS (SPAWAR 
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2004). NREMS will employ the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST) Federal Information 
Processing Standards (FIPS) 140-1 and NSA Certified DMS 
approved product, Type 2 Cryptographic Support Server 
(T2CSS).  T2CSS incorporates virtual tokens (FORTEZZA, PKI 
or other Certificate) in hardware providing Class 4 level 
of assurance16 (LOA) and the flexibility, scalability and 
security convenience only possible with virtual tokens. The 
product supports data confidentiality, data integrity, key 
management, digital signature and time-stamp services 
through the use of flexible hardware architecture.  The 
architecture design includes:  
1. A multiple cryptographic processor design 
optimized for a significant performance increase. 
2. Scaleable and flexible design - one or more 
cryptographic processors per board and multiple 
boards in a system.  
3. FORTEZZA Cryptographic Interface (CI) and 
Application Programming Interface (API) support. 
Authentication is the process of determining whether 
someone or something is, in fact, who or what it is 
declared to be. The U.S. Government's National Information 
Assurance Glossary defines strong authentication as: 
layered authentication approach relying on two or more 
authenticators to establish the identity of an originator 
or receiver of information. The NIPRNet will have a DOD PKI 
server certificate installed that will be used to establish 
a SSL (128 bit encryption) connection between the user’s 
browser and the AMHS (see Figure 6). The PKI distinguished 
                     
16 The extent to which an electronic identity credential may be 
trusted to actually represent that the individual named in the 
credential is the same person engaging in the electronic transaction 
with the application, service or relying party. Class 4 (Federal High) 
suggest medium assurance with hardware. 
www.cio.gov/fbca/presentations/alterman-terena.ppt, last accessed May 
2007. 
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name will then be associated to the users account, and 
subsequently, users will authenticate using their CAC 
certificate and CAC PIN, successfully meeting the NIST 
required authentication level.  The following steps are 
provided for NIPRNet: 
1.  Initial login, the user will be required to enter 
their AMHS user name and password. 
2.  Select a PKI certificate (CAC identity 
certificate) and enter CAC Personal 
Identification Number (PIN) used on the local 
workstation to unlock access to their private key 
information on the CAC itself. 
SIPRNet Web users will be required to authenticate 
using a user name and password that will be sent over an 
SSL session from the user’s workstation to NREMS due to the 
lack of DOD PKI within the domain (see Figure 7). SIPRNet 




Figure 6.   End User Web Access (NIPR) (From: PEO C4I 2007) 
 
 
Figure 7.   End User Web Access (SIPR) (From: PEO C4I 2007) 
 
Security in information systems is not a simple 
problem to resolve.  Single solutions are often if 
ever found to meet complex systems requirements.  The ISO 
Reference Model describes seven layers to define service 
levels.  The model is an ideal means to match requirements 
with solutions (see Table 2).  A security rule of thumb 
states: the higher the layer at which you can gain 











































































on the network to provide the service (Class Notes, CC4221; 
2002).  It is important to note that NREMS successfully 
implements security protection at all five of the seven 
layers of the OSI Reference Model with the use of SSL, 
passwords, and the hardware FORTEZZA solution. 
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Table 2.   OSI Reference Model Organization Matrix (CC4221 
Notes 2002) 
 
2. Modeling Quality Attributes 
Arena Student Version Modeling software was used to 
layout the NREMS architecture from the web client to 
network output.  Due to shortcomings in the student version 
of Arena, modeling hundreds of messages from a total of 
30,000 clients is not possible.  To work around this issue, 
clients have been reduced to a total of 700 users, four 
different message types [large, medium, small message 
(HTTPS 443)17 and administrative (SMTP)18 requests], and 
                     
17 HTTPS URL indicates that Hypertext Transfer Protocol is to be 
used, but with a different default TCP port (443) and an additional 
encryption/authentication layer between the HTTP and TCP. 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTPS, last accessed December 2006.  
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increased the processing time from seconds to minutes.  
Figure 8 illustrates the portion of the messaging 
architecture that was modeled, specifically leaving out DMS 
and legacy systems interconnected. 
 
 
Figure 8.   Arena Network Components Model (From: PEO C4I 
2005) 
 
The goal of the model is to compare the average wait 
time, total time in the system and the total number of 
released messages, during points of traffic surge or 
network failure. In engineering terms this scenario is 
defined as message latency; the time delay between the 
moment something is initiated, and the moment one of its 
effects begins or can be detected.  Latency tends to be 
inversely proportional to the performance of QoS of a 
system. 
                     
18 Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) is the de facto standard for 
e-mail transmissions across the Internet. 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SMTP, last accessed December 2006. 
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Modeling methodology centered on building a symmetric 
messaging architecture processing only inbound SMTP and 
HTTPS 443 traffic of varying size lengths and types.  
Following entity creation, each message will transit 
through the Navy Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI) OC-319 fiber 
optic pipe onto the NREMS network, specifically through the 
following dedicated components: 
 Domain Controllers - used for policy, security, 
and authentication 
 AMHS - System profiler - Incoming feed for web-
based system 
 CP-XP /w T2CSS - gateway to DMS network (DMS 
component) 
 IIS Web Server - provides the web interface for 
AMHS 
 SQL - the database server keeps a record of all 
messages, users, and the message access granted 
to those users 
 Autonomy K2 - performs retrospective search 
function 
 Storage Area Network (SAN) - message store (12-24 
Terabytes) 
Each dedicated component exists in pairs of two for a 
total of four components, two primary and two Continuity of 
Operations (COOP), in each regional site with the exception 
of the IIS.  Each component has a dedicated process with a 
triangulation distribution process time between 0.5 to 1.5 
minutes of process time.  Each entity (message) is 
processed at the primary system then duplicated to be 
stored in the COOP.  The following four scenarios will be 
modeled using 20 replications: 
                     
19 OC-3 is a network line with transmission speeds of up to 155.52 
Mbit/s (payload: 148.608 Mbit/s; overhead: 6.912 Mbit/s, including path 
overhead) using fiber optics. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OC-3, last 
accessed March 2007. 
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 Scenario 1: Failover 
 Scenario 2: AMHS Server Quantity Variations 
 Scenario 3: Peacetime vs. Wartime Surge  
 Scenario 4: Wartime Surge and Failover 
Using a set baseline derived from a scenario situation 
with all dependent variables constant, an approximation was 
obtained of each scenario effects on the entity time 
parameters, specifically time in system and time to 
process. Figure 9 illustrates the model for the NREMS 
NCTAMS Pacific architecture.  The model also includes the 
NREMS NCTAMS LANT architecture (not illustrated) which is 
interconnected to the NREMS NCTAMS PAC model to simulate 
failover. 
Each model includes the NREMS primary and COOP site, 
with the same number of servers per dedicated component.  
Additionally, message creation modules allow the alteration 
of inter-arrival times for each message type and 
administrative request.  The manipulation (shortening or 
lengthening) of the inter-arrival times will allow the 
model to simulate surge periods based upon the time of day 




Figure 9.   Arena NCTAMS PAC Model (From: PEO C4I 2005) 
 
Availability of the NREMS system is determined by 
identifying all possible states of the system's 
performance.  Parameters affecting the availability of 
NREMS include the rates at which seamless message exchange 
occur from web client to AMHS servers and the architecture 
layout should specifically compensate for wartime surge and 
failover requirements from one coast site to the other.  
Each site provides local failover and an alternate COOP 






















Figure 10.   NREMS High Level COOP Diagram (From: PEO C4I 
2007) 
 
As the basis of this analysis NCTAMS PAC and NCTAMS 
LANT connectivity will be mapped to assess system 
performance under different scenarios (see Figure 11).  In 
one embodiment of a model, NREMS availability and 
reliability will be determined based upon varying the 
following parameters: 
1. Number of incoming messages and administrative 
requests 
2. Message type: 
a.  Large Message: Message length > 4Kbytes 
b.  Medium Message: Message length between 
512bytes and 4Kbytes 
c.  Small Message: Message length < 512bytes 
3. Message pipe failure on PAC or LANT NREMS network 
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Figure 11.   NREMS Logical Diagram (From: PEO C4I 2007) 
 
As alluded to earlier, sensitivity points are 
parameters in the architecture to which some measurable 
quality attribute response is highly correlated.  A 
tradeoff point is found in the architecture when an AMHS 
server is host to more than one sensitivity point where the 
measurable quality attributes are affected differently by 
changing a particular parameter.  In the following 
analysis, there are two sensitivity points measured in 
relation to overall system availability and reliability: 
total time within the system (NREMS) and the total number 
of messages processed. 
3. Maintainability/Supportability 
The two RNOSC NREMS implementation is the Navy’s 
attempt to re-architect the unsuccessful implementation of 
the DMS project by resolving labor-intensive installations, 
operations and maintenance issues.  The program boasts of 
substantial costs savings over the next 10 years for the 
Navy, particularly to the end user commands, by alleviating 
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and reducing personnel necessary to operate and maintain 
the equipment (PEO C4I 2005).  The centralization of the 
core functions of the messaging systems will significantly 
decrease the need for command level expertise in functions 
such as upgrades, updates, simple and complex level 
maintenance, and troubleshooting for the system.  Field 
Engineering Notices (FENs) such as Figure 12 often over 
burden units to keep each component of the DMS system 




Figure 12.   DMS Field Engineering Notification (FEN) (From: 
Email: TSA 2007) 
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The maintenance and support burden of the system will 
be eased by the 2 RNOSC concept and the procurement plan 
for the system.  Approved products will be provided 24/7 
support with a contract vehicle in place for system 
upgrades.  The burden will shift from individual DSP sites 
to the designated RNOSC whom will be designated the 
responsibility for all of the complex maintenance and 
upkeep functions such as FEN updates, AMHS backups, 
FORTEZZA, and command level account established.  This will 
leave minimal responsibilities to the local command.  
System Administrators will be held responsible for 
establishing local user accounts via a web based process.   
D. SCENARIOS 
1. Scenario 1: Failover 
Failover is defined as the capability for a system to 
switch over automatically to a redundant or standby 
computer server upon the failure or abnormal termination of 
the previously active server.  The NREMS architecture has 
the capability to switchover to the assigned alternate 
regional site.  The following scenario will evaluate NREMS 
redundancy amidst primary and COOP site failover and how 
data consistency is maintained (so that one component can 
take over from another and be sure that it is in a 





























































































s Total Time in System
(Baseline)
Total Time in System
(Failover)
 
Figure 13.   Scenario 1 Failover Total Time in System 
 
In this particular scenario, NCTAMS PAC fails and 
NCTAMS LANT site must perform dual network operations 
(primary and COOP services), handling the messages and 
administrative requests transmitted during normal network 
operations for both sites.  Over an eight-hour normal 
workday, the average total time in system for 70% of the 
messages transmitted was six times longer than normal 
operations.  This six-fold increase in total time in system 
results in a 33% reduction in released messages (i.e., 
messages outbound from NREMS network to DMS backbone). The 
increased number of messages decreases the systems 
performance; specifically, the trade-off for increased 
message volume is an increase in processing time, resulting 
in decreased system performance. 
2. Scenario 2: AMHS Server Quantity Variation 
Prior to delving into this scenario, it is important 
to explain the reason for the emphasis on the AMHS servers 
of the NREMS architecture.  The AMHS is designed as a 
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network solution to alleviate the problems faced by 
organizations with large volumes of message traffic sent to 
and from generic email services.  The AMHS allows the 
organization's users to filter and route messages based on 
context, preference, and priority.  The AMHS solution also 
provides support for the DOD’s AUTODIN and DMS messaging 
systems, making it available to the legacy and DMS 
architectures as individual commands migrate systems.  
Since the AMHS servers play such an intricate role in the 
entire NREMS network, a majority of the time constraints in 
the model are considered based on the AMHS server ability 
to adapt to both physical and logical changes in the 
system.   
Scalability is the ability of the AMHS to shrink and 
expand to fulfill existing and future system requirements.  
This attribute is essential to the overall performance, 
availability and reliability of a system.  For the purpose 
of this thesis, the AMHS servers were physically expanded 
to make use of 3 servers vice 1. The model architecture 
variability tests the effects of an increased capacity on 
the systems available resource usage distribution.  The 
Arena-modeled variability in the server architecture from 1 
to 3 resulted in a minimal increase in overall systems 
efficiency which may prove to be much smaller than the 
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Figure 14.   Scenario 2 AMHS Server Quantity Variation 
 
3. Scenario 3: Peace Time vs. Wartime Surge 
Wartime surge capability is modeled by varying the 
message and administrative request inter-arrival times to 
half the baseline value.  



























































































s Total Time in System
(Baseline)
Total Time in System
(Failover)
 
Figure 15.   Scenario 3 Peacetime vs. Wartime Surge Total 
Time in System 
 
During normal and wartime simulations, 556 and 1,732 
messages and administrative request were transmitted 
76 
respectively.  The difference in total time in system for 
each message type from a peacetime to wartime scenario is 
minimal (approximately a 15% increase in total time in 
system). 
4. Scenario 4: Wartime Surge and Failover 
The following scenario will evaluate NREMS redundancy 
amidst failover and availability during a wartime surge 
period.  The failover consists of a failure on the NCTAMS 
PAC network, causing all messages from the Pacific coast to 
utilize the NCTAMS LANT network to process all messages and 
administrative requests.  The wartime surge scenario is 
modeled by cutting in half the inert-arrival times of each 
message transmission and administrative requests. 
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Figure 16.   Scenario 4 Wartime Failover Total Time in 
System  
 
During normal and wartime simulations, 524 and 722 
messages and administrative request were transmitted 
respectively.  Over an eight-hour normal workday, the 
average total time in system for 50% of the messages 
77 
transmitted was six times longer than normal operations.  
This six-fold increase in total time in system results in a 
33% reduction in released messages (i.e., messages outbound 
from NREMS network to DMS backbone). 
E. USER SURVEYS 
Little data exists to characterize existing Naval 
messaging business processes or to determine the best, 
future business process to implement for an organization.  
How many Naval messaging organizations currently use a 
DMDS?  How many message readers, drafters, and releasers 
does each organization have assigned?  How often do 
organizations access messaging resources?  When do they 
access messaging most?  This data is required to determine 
what business processes and resources should be in place 
after the transition from DMS to NREMS in order to 
adequately support the needs of Naval messaging. 
In conjunction with the Space and Naval Warfare 
Systems Command, San Diego, a decision tree was developed 
to assist the NMWG and Naval messaging organizations with 
how to best structure their assets after the transition 
from DMS to NREMS.  (see Figure 3)  Past survey efforts 
have consisted of requests, via formal Naval messages, for 
organizational data from Naval messaging organizations.  
These requests have received little if any response using 
this method.  Instead, a web-enabled survey was developed 
with questions that were easy to answer (point and click).  
The entire survey requires less than ten minutes to 
complete.  The data gathered will be used to navigate the 
decision tree developed and determine which business 
process each messaging organization should implement.  
Additional areas of interest to the Space and Naval Warfare 
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Systems Command were also added to take full advantage of 
the opportunity to reach Naval messaging organizations, 
i.e., questions not required to navigate the decision tree 
but would assist in determining when and how to deploy 
messaging assets.   
1. NREMS Business Processes 
Within NREMS, the NMWG has defined six separate 
business processes that each Naval messaging command can 
adopt as appropriate.  Each business process is defined by 
outbound messaging requirements and inbound messaging 
requirements.   
For outbound messaging, messages can be released 
either using a web proxy or an SMTP proxy.  A web proxy 
requires no resources at the command level other than a 
computer with a web browser.  An SMTP proxy requires setup 
at the command and command resources to maintain.  SMTP 
proxies are required for commands that have a large number 
of outgoing message traffic. 
For inbound messaging, messages can be received either 
directly through the internet (web interface) or through 
the use of a DMDS.  Again, web users require no resources 
at the command level other than a computer with a web 
browser.  A DMDS requires setup at the command and command 
resources to maintain.  A DMDS is required for commands 
that have a large number of inbound message traffic. 
The six business processes are variations of outbound 
messaging requirements (web vs. SMTP) and inbound messaging 




 Outbound: SMTP Proxy 
Inbound: DMDS Folder Delivery 
 Outbound: SMTP Proxy 
Inbound: DMDS User Delivery 
 Outbound: Web Proxy 
Inbound: DMDS Folder Delivery 
 Outbound: Web Proxy 
Inbound: DMDS User Delivery  
 Outbound: Web Proxy 
Inbound: Web Bulletin Board Delivery 
 Outbound: Web Proxy 
Inbound: Web User Delivery 
The business process assigned is based solely on four 
organizational characteristics: number of message 
releasers, number of message drafters, number of message 
readers, and the use of read boards or public folders.  By 
responding to questions about these characteristics, a 
Naval messaging organization can determine which model best 
fits their command messaging requirements.  By gathering 
data about these characteristics, the Space and Naval 
Warfare Systems Command can determine how to best allocate 
resources for customers that might require a DMDS or SMTP 
proxy. 
2. The Survey 
a. Survey Terminology 
Concurrent searches:  Readers performing a search 
of messages simultaneously; an important attribute that 
must be monitored to maintain an appropriate NREMS load. 
Message Drafter:  Those individuals with the 
authority to draft messages within AMHS. 
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Message Reader:  The majority of NREMS users; 
those individuals with the authority to read messages 
within AMHS.   
Message Releaser:  Those individuals with the 
authority to release a message from their organization to 
another organization. 
Messaging rush hour:  The period of time during a 
normal workday when message readers will typically access 
messages and messaging resources.  Normally, this occurs at 
the beginning or end of a work day. 
PLA:  Plain language address.  A unique 
identifier used by Naval messaging organizations similar to 
a mailing address.  Used to identify the sending 
organization on the “FROM:” line or the intended receiving 
organization on the “TO:” line of a Naval message.  For 
example, the PLA “AIMD WHIDBEY ISLAND WA” indicates 
Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance Department, Whidbey 
Island, Washington.   
Read board or public folders:  equivalent terms 
referring to the method of message delivery.  Messages can 
be delivered to specific individuals via email or to a read 
board/public folder that readers can access.   
Search of messages:  The ability to search for 
key words in current messages or the messaging archive.  
DMS does not offer a search engine for current or archived 
messages.  NREMS will offer this feature.  However, care 
must be taken to monitor the NREMS load while conducting 
searches as searches require a significant amount of system 
bandwidth. 
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Zulu Time:  Greenwich Mean Time; Universal 
Coordinated Time (UTC). 
b. Survey Development 
Survey questions were carefully crafted to 
navigate the Naval messaging business process decision tree 
for NREMS and to gather additional information of interest 
to the NMWG.  The survey questions were submitted to the 
NMWG and its members for review and approval.  Once 
approved, the final survey was drafted utilizing the tools 
available in the website Surveymonkey.com. 
SurveyMonkey.com was selected as the data 
gathering mechanism for the survey.  This website contains 
easy to use survey templates that gather information, store 
it, and publish it to the researcher in a multitude of 
useful formats:  spreadsheet, HTML (web pages) and Adobe 
Acrobat files (.pdf). 
A draft survey, utilizing the approved survey 
questions, was created in SurveyMonkey.com.  A web link was 
created to the survey and disseminated to members of the 
NMWG via email.  Interested parties were given one week to 
view and navigate the survey and provide feedback.  The 
feedback was addressed either by provision of additional 
clarifying information or revision of the survey and the 
final survey was agreed upon.  Then, a web link was created 
to access the final survey and ready it for dissemination 
to all registered Naval messaging users. 
c. Survey Dissemination 
The web link to the survey was disseminated to 
every registered Naval messaging user via email.  (See 
Figure 2)  All Naval messaging users are required to 
register with the Naval messaging website.  On the date of 
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survey delivery to prospective respondents, the Naval 
messaging website had 1,659 registered users. The web link 
to the survey was emailed to all 1,659 registered users.   
Our target population was all command system 
administrators.  Each system administrator is responsible 
for managing access to the Naval messaging resources for 
their command.  Command system administrators add and 
delete message releasers, drafters and readers and develop 
and enforce local Naval messaging policies.  Command system 
administrators are responsible for maintaining all command 
hardware and software in support of Naval messaging.  Only 
one response was required per command (PLA) and only from 
the command system administrator who is most qualified to 
provide it.   
Once the email was released, command system 
administrators were afforded two weeks to complete the 
survey.  At the end of the two weeks, the survey was closed 
and could no longer be accessed.  On the date of survey 
delivery, the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command 
estimated the number of command system administrators to be 
850.  We received 178 responses from our target audience of 
850.   
3. User Survey Analysis 
Once the survey was released, the data was gathered in 
real time as respondents accessed the web link.  After the 
survey was closed, the data was reviewed for completeness 
and incomplete data was deleted.  The remaining data was 
imported into a Microsoft Access database.  Queries and 
reports were generated in Access to determine the 
appropriate business process for each responding  
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organization and then extrapolated across the Naval 
messaging enterprise.  All data and analysis were provided 
to the thesis sponsor.   
a. Data Gathering 
As each respondent (command system administrator) 
accessed the web link, they were directed to the first page 
of the survey, the informed consent page.  (See Appendix A)  
Once respondents agreed to the conditions of the survey, 
the respondents could access the survey questions.  The 
survey maximized the use of radial buttons (one answer 
only) and required responses to the survey questions that 
were necessary to navigate the Naval messaging business 
process decision tree.  Respondents could also exit the 
survey at any point and return to the survey later if 
desired. 
The survey responses were stored in real time in 
a database by SurveyMonkey.com.  Researchers could access 
the results at any time during the survey to monitor 
progress.  Some survey responses were deleted entirely if 
insufficient information was gathered to navigate the 
decision tree.  The majority of deleted responses included 
nothing beyond agreeing to the informed consent page and 
provided no useful information.  Approximately 50 responses 
fell into this category. 
At the end of the survey period (two weeks), the 
survey was closed and the data exported into a Microsoft 
Excel spreadsheet.  The Excel spreadsheet was reconfigured 
so that it could easily be imported into Microsoft Access.  
The resulting Microsoft Access database table can be viewed 
in Appendix B.  
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Not all data gathered were imported into Access 
as not all data was required to navigate the decision tree.  
However, the complete set of data in an excel spreadsheet 
was maintained and forwarded to the thesis sponsor, the 
Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command.  An overview of 
the data gathered, as provided by SurveyMonkey.com, can be 
viewed in Appendix C. 
b. Data Analysis 
Using the Naval messaging business process 
decision tree (Figure 3), eight queries were written in 
Microsoft Access to determine which and how many commands 
fit into each Naval messaging business process. Two of the 
end nodes can be reached using two separate paths depending 
on the respondent’s answer to survey question number three:  
“How many message releasers does your organization have?”  
Therefore, two additional queries were required to reach 
each of these two end nodes.  Appendix D contains the SQL 
queries. 
Using the queries, eight reports for each of the 
six business processes were designed to list each PLA for 
each business process type as well as the total count.  
Appendix E contains the generated reports based on the data 
gathered. 
Table 3 contains the summary of the data 
gathered.  Each of the 178 respondents was characterized by 
using their responses to navigate the decision tree.  Of 
the 178 responses, 11 respondents did not provide enough 
information to navigate the tree and were labeled as 
unknown business process model.  However, only six percent 
of responses fell into this category.  Three additional 
responses were considered suspect: one PLA was listed twice 
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with conflicting information and another PLA was listed as 
“we guard for over 100 PLA’s.”  After discussions with the 
Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command, those three 
responses were left in the data as it was believed that 




Table 3.   Summary of Data from User Surveys 
 
Although we attempted to gain responses from our 
total population of 850 messaging commands, our sample 
population consisted of 178 messaging commands (those that 
responded with sufficient information to navigate the 
decision tree).  We received responses from 20.9% of our 
total population.  We do not have enough information to 
determine if our sample adequately represents the total 
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population.  We are unaware of an unusual number of 
responses from any one category of messaging command that 
might skew the data in any direction.  Therefore, it is 
assumed that the data gathered does not unduly represent 
any specific category of messaging command, but adequately 
represents all of Naval messaging.   
c. Data Provided 
A copy of the entire database with the 
preformatted queries and reports was provided to our 
sponsor, the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command.  Data 
can easily be added, deleted and edited without affecting 
the queries or reports.  The queries can be rerun and 
revised reports printed from the revised data. 
Additionally, a complete copy of all responses 
were supplied to our sponsor in an excel spreadsheet that 




This chapter will summarize the findings of the ATAM, 
the change management process analysis and the analysis of 
user surveys.  Architectural conclusions will be based upon 
NREMS ability to meet the OSD and JCS requirements for 
organizational messaging (interoperability, availability, 
scalability, and maintainability) while maintaining an 
acceptable level of security risk.  Chapter VI quality 
attribute and modeling sections will be used to support the 
author’s conclusions.  NREMS problem characterization, 
Chapter IV Section B.3 will be addressed for their 
potential impact on mandated requirements.  Business 
Process Reengineering (BPR), based upon user surveys, 
conclusions will provide a basis for the potential success 
or failure of the NREMS implementation within the Navy.  
User needs and their level understanding will be the focal 
points of discussion. 
A. ARCHITECTURE FEASIBILITY 
Interoperability is the key to achieving net-centric 
warfare.  Information systems within the DOD and among our 
allies must communicate within a common framework with 
common definitions of data in order to effectively process 
information and allow leaders to provide sound decisions.   
1. Interoperability 
NREMS is a web based system which can be accessed via 
SMTP, providing an inherently interoperable messaging 
system.  SMTP is a common framework for web-enabled 
messaging.  This creates an environment in which allies can 
operate with read-only privileges and rely upon their 
traditional communications systems for transmitting message 
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traffic.  The ability of the AMHS to integrate with other 
external systems i.e., legacy provides the ability to 
transmit and receive traffic without degrading the level of 
service and will appear transparent to the customer. 
2. Availability 
Availability to a secure web based message search 
capability with minimal disruption of services is at the 
discretion of many factors.  For the purpose of this thesis 
the problems characterized within Chapter III; NMCI 
Connectivity, DOD PKI availability, and CP-XP service 
restart time will be the focal points of discussion. 
a. Navy Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI) 
Connectivity 
Insufficient bandwidth has always been on the 
Navy’s top 10 lists of communications constraints.  The 
Navy Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI) provides the Department 
of the Navy (DON) with network-based information services 
on a single, enterprise-wide intranet.  NREMS will become a 
critical operational system within the NMCI environment and 
therefore must go through the rigorous approval process 
currently in place.  NMCI must be prepared to provide 
sufficient connectivity, bandwidth and network services to 
support NREMS.  The current state of affairs leaves way for 
schedule delays, costs increases and potential access 
control conflicts.  The following are examples of ongoing 
issues: 
1. February 2007, SPAWAR 055 Capacity Management 
Team ordered an OC3 (155.52 Mbps) circuit upgrade 
at NCTAMS PAC to sufficiently support COOP 
responsibilities for NCTAMS LANT.  The circuit 
was scheduled to be complete by May 2007, yet it 
remains an open order with NMCI contractors. 
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2. Since the OC3 installation was not part of the 
original contract, the costs associated with the 
bandwidth upgrades are unknown until the project 
is complete. 
3. Although DISA owns the Global Information Grid 
(GIG) firewall, the NMCI firewall is controlled 
by the NMCI contactors.  All ports must be 
approved prior to opening.  This problem may seem 
minuscule, however as stated earlier the approval 
process within the NMCI network is no easy tasks.  
The simple addition of applications such as 
AUTOCAD has been known to take up to two months 
to be authorized.  In the case of NREMS, 
“ActiveX” must be allowed in order to interact 
with the AMHS via Internet Explorer.  This was 
not originally approved on NMCI systems; 
therefore a request was placed to enable this 
function on the NMCI clients. 
b. DOD PKI availability 
PKI is not completely established in the 
unclassified domain, not well established in the SECRET 
messaging domain and completely lacking in the Top 
Secret/Collateral (TS/C) messaging domain.  Although the 
high side networks are considered secure networks, PKI 
ensures authenticity, integrity and confidentiality for DOD 
messaging is maintained.  The absence of PKI does not meet 
DMS MROC 3-88, NIST or FIPS mandated requirements. 
c. CP-XP Service Restart Time 
The CP-XP performs a re-caching (or revalidation) 
service of stored certifications and, based on the quantity 
of personalities hosted by a particular AMHS server, can be 
an operation preventing timely and full return-to-service 
of the AMHS overall.  The impact posed by the profilers 
process shut down is a complete system failure and the 





The ability of the system to scale to fit a large-
scale enterprise while maintaining all the messaging 
performance characteristics during peace and wartime 
operations requires a more in-depth analysis than the Arena 
data presented within this thesis.  The multi-user 
capability of the AMHS has been tested and approved for a 
load capacity of up to 30,000 users within a network 
environment.  Although this is a significant accomplishment 
from the original single service server, the Arena model 
displays inconsistent performance during increased volumes 
of traffic (Scenario 3), particularly when the need arises 
for a single RNOSC to perform dual network operations for 
both PAC and LANT users. 
a. Failover 
Arena modeled scenarios 1 and 4 resulted in a 
six-fold increase in total time to process within the 
system, or a 33% reduction in the amount of messages 
released under normal operations. The increased volume of 
messages decreases the systems performance under the 
current proposed architecture. 
b. AMHS Server Quantity Increase 
An attempt to increase the number of AMHS servers 
resulted in a minimal increase in efficiency for the 
overall system.  Based upon the Arena modeling scenario 2, 
up to 3 AMHS servers were made available to increase the 
efficiency of processing increased volumes of messages.  
The results proved insignificant to increase the 
performance of the system whether in normal or wartime 
operations.  It appears that there is no value added to 
increase the number of AHMS servers available for 
processing messages.  The author suspects that this 
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architecture is unable to use hardware as a viable solution 
to its load balancing problem because all message traffic 
must be processed in three different systems. 
1. Processed via the primary system. 
2. Stored within the local site back-up system for 
redundancy with the use of “Double-Take20.” 
3. Shadowed at the alternate COOP site via VPN for 
contingency purposes. 
More hardware may actually complicate this 
process vice increase performance and efficiency. 
4. Maintainability 
Maintainability of the system based upon the 2 RNOSC 
concept significantly decreases costs and increases the 
standardization and compliance of the DMS architecture.  
The current DMS architecture poses several significant 
issues that can be significantly decreased if not 
alleviated by NREMS; specifically:  
1. Costs to support eight DSP sites and command 
level UA requirements. 
2. Dedicated messaging client hardware with a 
FORTEZZA card at each site to attain security. 
3. FORTEZZA card, a token, requires special 
knowledge by administrators for issuing 
certificates, creation, storage and handling. 
4. End users accountability for the safeguard of the 
FORTEZZA card upon issue throughout the cards 
lifespan, this poses various storage and handling 
issues. 
5. Certificate Authorities (CAs) are often off-site 
and non-local which creates a logistical 
nightmare during the issuance or re-issue of the 
FORTEZZA card. 
 
                     
20 Double-Take software products and services enable customers to 
protect and recover business-critical data and applications to support 
disaster recovery, high availability and centralized backup. 
http://www.doubletake.com/ last accessed 2 May 2007. 
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6. Maintenance requirements placed on the end user 
with regards to the DMS client.  The client 
requires regular and sometimes very complex 
patches or configuration updates. 
7. High level DMS administrative skills and often 
extensive timelines for DMS Service Providers 
(DSPs) to fully implement the necessary updates. 
NREMS or the Telos AMHS has the potential to resolve 
these costly maintenance and support issues. 
5. Summary 
NREMS architecture can achieve the requirements of a 
messaging system as set forth by OSD and JCS.  Because 
NREMS is a web-enabled version of DMS, it remains an 
interoperable messaging system within DOD and among our 
allies.  Although availability remains an issue with Navy 
networks, availability is not an issue with NREMS.  
Bandwidth, PKI and CP-XP performance are easily resolved by 
procuring available technology.  These issues are not 
issues resulting from the use or implementation of 
DMS/NREMS, but issues common for naval networks.  NREMS is 
easily scaled for any naval messaging organization.  
However, NREMS should still be tested as a complete system 
in a high demand environment.  DMS was tested in this 
manner.  The complete NREMS has yet to be tested.  Reducing 
the Naval message stores to two locations and creating a 
web-enabled system drastically reduces the maintenance 
requirements of Naval messaging with the implementation of 
NREMS.  With the proper procurement of appropriate 
technology to support the NREMS product, NREMS is capable 





B. BUSINESS PROCESS REENGINEERING FEASIBILITY 
This thesis analyzed the NREMS project implementation 
plan, surveyed Naval messaging users, and characterized the 
business processes for Naval messaging organizations after 
implementation of NREMS. 
1. Change Management Analysis 
It is apparent from the analysis of the change 
management process and encounters with Naval messaging 
users during our research, that some Naval messaging users 
(change recipients) distrust and are skeptical of the 
transition from DMS to NREMS.  Other users are unaware of 
the transition.   
Naval messaging commands and capabilities suffered 
greatly during the transition from AUTODIN to DMS.  To 
date, AUTODIN has still not been completely phased out.  
Culturally, Naval messaging users are unwilling to make 
another transition, regardless of its viability.  Naval 
messaging users and their perceptions are the biggest 
roadblock to this change endeavor. 
A tremendous effort has gone into providing resources 
for Naval messaging users regarding NREMS: website, 
training courses, newsletters, etc.  All of these resources 
exist in a pull format.  In other words, interested users 
must be willing to access the information in order for them 
to receive it.  Because end user buy-in is very low, few 
people are willing to access these resources.  As a result, 
few individuals are aware of the NREMS project.  
2. User Surveys 
The data gathered from user surveys is characterized 
in Table 3 and Appendix C.  From that data, we can 
determine the following (see Table 4):  
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 DMDS users will decrease by 6% after 
implementation of NREMS, producing a minor 
decrease in resources required. 
 Naval messaging organizations will receive 41% of 
their messages and send 76% of their messages 
through the web portal.   
 The majority of Naval messaging commands (76%) 
have fewer than 20 message drafters and 20 
releasers and will function well with a Web proxy 
for outgoing messages. 
Total number of Respondents (Sample Size) 178 100% 850 
    
Population Size 850   
    
Inbound:  DMDS Users  98 59% 468 
Inbound:  Web Users  69 41% 329 
Total  167 100% 797 
    
Outbound:  SMTP Proxy 40 24% 191 
Outbound:  Web Proxy 127 76% 606 
Total  167 100% 797 
    
Current DMDS Users  115 65%  
Table 4.   User Survey Statistics 
 
 Because of the high volume of messages, 24% of 
Naval messaging users will require an SMTP proxy 
at their command. 
 37.1% of DMS users access messaging from 1201Z-
1400Z times (0700-0900 EST and 0200-0400 Hawaii 
Time).  It appears that the majority of message 
readers access messaging from the East Coast 
first thing in the morning. 
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Figure 17.   Naval Messaging Rush Hours 
 
 91.6% of respondents currently use DMS. 
 The majority of message readers (67.1%) read 
their messages daily. 
 
C. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS 
Chapter I presented our primary research objective:  
illustrate the functional contribution and change 
management process of the NREMS program implementation 
efforts in the Navy.  To achieve this objective, this 
thesis posed two supporting research questions. 
1. Architectural Transition Research 
How does the Classic DMS to NREMS architecture change 
contribute to: (1) the CNO direction for consolidation of 
communications resources on home soil, and (2) the CNO 
direction to transition off of and close down legacy 
systems?  
96 
 What is the current Classic client server DMS 
architecture and where is it deployed?  
 What is the current NREMS architecture, its 
technical advantages, and where will it be 
deployed? 
 How does the NREMS implementation answer the 
CNO's direction and what are the key benefits in 
cost and performance?  
The current DMS architecture set the stage for what 
the JCS now seeks in DOD communications, Net-centric 
Enterprise Services.  The COTS based product development 
and the centralized services offered by DMS gave way to 
interoperable, cost effective, adaptable and flexible 
architecture that is no longer service unique.  Although 
the DOD continues to seek further advantages in costs and 
maintainability, it is the shift from AUTODIN to DMS that 
affords the opportunity to extend the use of available and 
current technology to the end user while continuing to meet 
the DOD’s operational requirements.  NREMS allows the DOD 
to extend DMS’s messaging capabilities without the 
onslaught of increased hardware installations, increased 
personnel support requirements, and significant cost over-
runs due to site specific requirements. 
The existing technology allows the DOD to take 
advantage of proven reliable enterprise services that are 
currently in existence in the commercial industry.  
Although the system is presented with the shore based 
architecture in mind, the means to extend the network to at 
sea units or the Marine in the field is only constrained by 
the bandwidth available to the end user. 
2. Business Process Transition Research 
Evaluate the transition from DMS to NREMS. 
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 Is the transition plan from DMS to NREMS 
effective?  What are its strengths and 
weaknesses? 
 Determine Naval messaging organizations’ business 
process.  How can commands be differentiated to 
support appropriate levels of service in order to 
create the appropriate requirements document for 
contract awarded to support NREMS?   
a. The Transition Plan 
The transition plan was analyzed in Chapter III 
using Jick’s change management framework.   
The strengths of the transition plan include a 
detailed vision, a thorough implementation plan, a strong 
sense of urgency among the leadership, and an abundance of 
enabling structures to support the change effort.  The 
detailed vision is a transition from a client-server 
architecture to a web-enabled messaging system that reduces 
infrastructural support requirements, centralizes resources 
and provides a uniform messaging system throughout the 
Navy.  The NMWG has developed a simple, but detailed 
implementation plan with activities assigned and a time 
line for completion.  The plan is flexible so that 
appropriate changes can be made as the transition 
progresses.  The funding for legacy systems will be 
eliminated in fiscal year 2011.  Therefore, it is 
imperative that Naval messaging transition to NREMS as 
quickly as possible.  The NMWG and the Space and Naval 
Warfare Systems Command have information and training 
resources available for end user to access if desired.  All 
of these factors will benefit the change process. 
However, the transition plan has not addressed 
some areas of concern.  A thorough understanding of the 
current Naval messaging enterprise (data about assets and 
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users) does not exist.  The assets and resources procured 
in support of the transition are based on educated guesses.  
If inaccurate, transition efforts can suffer causing 
increased costs and implementation plan delays.  No formal 
feedback system exists for change recipients to provide 
feedback.  Transition plan information and resources are 
available in a pull format.  This format is sufficient if 
change recipients buy-in to the proposed change.  However, 
this is not the case.  The fall out of the change efforts 
undertaken during the transition from AUTODIN to DMS is 
tremendous change recipient skepticism and resistance to 
change.  This is not easily overcome.  Current efforts are 
not sufficient to address a lack of change recipient buy-
in.   
b. Business Processes 
In conjunction with the Space and Naval Warfare 
Systems Command, six businesses processes were defined as 
outlined in Chapter V.  A Naval messaging user survey was 
conducted to gather data about the Naval messaging 
organization.  This data was used to characterize the 
current Naval messaging process and determine the 
appropriate business process for an organization 
implementing NREMS.  All user data and a user database were 
provided to Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command.  The 
database can be maintained and edited to provide more 
current or additional information.  Preformatted queries 
and reports were created in the database as well.  As the 
database is updated, the queries can be rerun and reports 
generated to reflect the current status of Naval messaging.   
3. Summary 
In spite of some of the challenges with the 
architecture and change management plan, the transition 
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from DMS to NREMS has tremendous merit.  The opportunities 
made available by the transition from AUTODIN to DMS (use 
of COTS products and proven technology) are consistent with 
DOD’s transition to a Net-centric environment and Net-
centric Enterprise Services.  As evidence of successful 
implementations of NREMS progress throughout the Pacific 
theater, end users will institutionalize this significant 
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VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS 
This chapter offers recommendations for further 
consideration. 
A. FINDINGS 
Architecturally there are technical issues that must 
be thoroughly reviewed and tested to ensure system is 
operating at peak performance level.   
 CP-XP start time failures may become the Achilles 
hill for the system if the components are not 
tested for cause and effect.   
 The ability of the system to handle failover 
while maintaining expected levels of performance 
could also cause high level damage if the AMHS’s 
maximum capacity capabilities are discovered 
during a real wartime scenario when 
communications are vital.   
These problems, however grave they may seem, can be tested, 
identified, and corrected or controlled with the proper 
implementation strategy.  They only become high risks when 
the proper time and dollars are not directed to ensure the 
components performance quality attributes are met. 
The core of the NREMS success will rest with high 
level support and implementation of supporting policies and 
procedures that will ensure the program succeeds.  Pending 
infrastructure issues such as DOD PKI and NMCI connectivity 
are not based upon failed technical solutions.  They are 
the direct result of bureaucratic policies and procedures 
that inhibit progress.  The DMS transformation to NREMS is 
driven by increased cost savings, decreased maintenance 
requirements and improved personnel support issues.  The 
program solves those issues and with the proper support can  
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meet and maybe even exceed DMS MROC 3-88 (technical), CJCSI 
5721.01C (policy) and command user (operational) 
requirements. 
Culturally, much remains to be done to convince change 
recipients that the NREMS project has merit.  End users 
remain at best, apathetic, at worst skeptical and sometimes 
hostile, when introduced to the NREMS project.  Although 
not a significant business process change, NREMS can still 
suffer from delayed implementation schedules if the change 
recipient does not cooperate fully and avail him/herself of 
the required training and resources available to ease the 
transition and assist in institutionalization of the new 
business process.  The change culture of Naval messaging 
can create unanticipated expenditure of time and resources 
if not addressed properly, and an unwillingness to 
institutionalize the new business process.  A thorough risk 
analysis of the potential impact of change recipient 
resistance would be appropriate to determine if current 
change efforts might be significantly impacted.    
The database provided to the Space and Naval Warfare 
Systems Command offers the most current information 
available about the Naval messaging organization.  As each 
Naval messaging command is visited during the transition, 
additional information can be added to the database and 
current information revised.  This simple endeavor can 
easily address the lack of knowledge of the current Naval 
messaging organization. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE STUDY 
 Past testing and evaluation of NREMS consisted of 
testing the AMHS core component only.  The entire 
DMS architecture was tested in the JTIC lab.  
Recommend testing of the entire NREMS 
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architecture in the lab environment to determine 
that the NREMS product will meet critical quality 
attribute requirements. 
 Evaluation of afloat activity bandwidth 
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APPENDIX B.  SURVEY RESPONDENT DATA 
PLA Number of Message 
Releasers 






Email DMDS DMS 
63216 0 - 5 0 - 5 0 - 20 Yes No No Yes 
AEGIS TECHREP 
MOORESTOWN NJ 
0 - 5 0 - 5 21 - 50 No Yes No Yes 
AEGIS TRAREDCEN 
DAHLGREN VA 
0 - 5 11-20 Greater than 75 No Yes Yes Yes 
AIMD JACKSONVILLE FL 0 - 5 11-20 Greater than 75 Yes No No Yes 
AIMD KEY WEST(uc) 0 - 5 0 - 5 0 - 20 Yes No Yes Yes 
AIMD TRUAX CORPUS 6-10 0 - 5 Greater than 75 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
AIMD WHIDBEY ISLAND 
WA 
0 - 5 11-20 Greater than 75 No Yes Yes Yes 
APL JHU LAUREL MD Greater than 20 Greater than 20 Greater than 75 No Yes Yes Yes 
CENNAVAVNTECHTRA 
PENSACOLA FL 
0 - 5 11-20 51 - 75 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
CENNAVLEADERSHIP 
DAM NECK VA 
0 - 5 0 - 5 Greater than 75 Yes No Yes Yes 
CENSEABEESFACENG 
DET FT LEONARD WOOD 
MO 
0 - 5 0 - 5 51 - 75 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
CENSURFDETPHILADEL
PHIA, PA 
0 - 5 0 - 5 0 - 20 No No No Yes 
CENTECTRAGRU DET 
ATSUGI 
0 - 5 0 - 5 21 - 50 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
CMIONORFALKVA 0 - 5 11-20 0 - 20 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
CNATRA CORPUS 
CHRISTI TX 
0 - 5 6-10 Greater than 75 Yes No Yes Yes 
CNATRA DET 
KINGSVILLE TX 
0 - 5 0 - 5 0 - 20 No Yes Yes Yes 
CNATRADETCC 0 - 5 0 - 5 0 - 20 Yes No Yes Yes 
COM TWO TWO NCR 0 - 5 Greater than 20 51 - 75     
COMNAVAIRSYSCOM//6.
1.2.2  
0 - 5 0 - 5 51 - 75 No No No Yes 
COMNAVAIRWARCENA
CDIV PATUXENT RIVER 
MD 
Greater than 20 Greater than 20 Greater than 75 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
COMNAVREG MIDLANT 
NORFOLK VA 
11-20 Greater than 20 Greater than 75 Yes Yes No No 
COMNAVREG SW SAN 
DIEGO CA 
Greater than 20 Greater than 20 Greater than 75 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
COMNAVSAFECEN 
NORFOLK VA 
0 - 5 0 - 5 Greater than 75 Yes No Yes Yes 
COMNAVSEASYSCOM 
WASHINGTON DC 
6-10 Greater than 20 Greater than 75 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
COMNCWGRU TWO 
PORTSMOUTH VA 
0 - 5 Greater than 20 Greater than 75 Yes No Yes Yes 
COMOMAG CORPUS 
CHRISTI TX 
6-10 0 - 5 21 - 50 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
COMPACFLT PEARL 
HARBOR HI 
Greater than 20 Greater than 20 Greater than 75 No No Yes No 
COMPATRECONWING 
ELEVEN 
Greater than 20 Greater than 20 21 - 50 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
COMSPAWARSYSCOM 
SAN DIEGO CA 
Greater than 20 Greater than 20 Greater than 75 No Yes Yes Yes 
COMSUBGRU EIGHT REP 
NORTHWOOD UK 
0 - 5 6-10 0 - 20 No Yes Yes Yes 
COMTRAWING FIVE 
MILTON FL 
0 - 5 11-20 Greater than 75 Yes No Yes Yes 
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Releasers 






Email DMDS DMS 
COMTRAWING TWO 
KINGSVILLE TX 
0 - 5 0 - 5 21 - 50 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
DLD WC SUPP 
BREMERTON WA 
0 - 5 0 - 5 0 - 20 No Yes No Yes 
DPTNAVSCI 
GLAKESMARICAD 
TRAVERSE CITY MI 
0 - 5 0 - 5 0 - 20 No No No Yes 
EODMU SIX 0 - 5 11-20 Greater than 75     
EODMU SIX DET 
PANAMA CITY  FL 
0 - 5 0 - 5 0 - 20 Yes No Yes Yes 
FACSFAC VACAPES 6-10 Greater than 20 Greater than 75 Yes No Yes Yes 
FACSFAC VACAPES 11-20 11-20 21 - 50 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
FISC SIGONELLA IT 0 - 5 0 - 5 21 - 50 No Yes Yes Yes 
FLELOGSUPPRON FOUR 
SIX 
0 - 5 11-20 21 - 50 No Yes Yes Yes 
HELSEACOMBATRON 
TWO 
0 - 5 11-20 Greater than 75 Yes No Yes Yes 
HSL SIX ZERO MAYPORT 
FL 
6-10 0 - 5 Greater than 75 Yes Yes No Yes 
MINWARTRACEN 
INGLESIDE TX (UC) 
6-10 11-20 Greater than 75 No Yes No Yes 
MSCREP SEATTLE WA 0 - 5 0 - 5 0 - 20 Yes No Yes Yes 
MTCC CAMP LEJEUNE Greater than 20 Greater than 20 51 - 75     
NACOPSPTCEN 0 - 5 6-10 21 - 50 Yes No Yes Yes 
NAS CORPUS CHRISTI 
TX 
0 - 5 0 - 5 21 - 50 Yes No Yes Yes 
NAS JAX 11-20 Greater than 20 Greater than 75 Yes No Yes Yes 
NAS OCEANA VA Greater than 20 Greater than 20 Greater than 75 Yes No Yes No 
NAVAMMOLOGCEN 
AMMOPAC SAN DIEGO 
CA 
0 - 5 6-10 21 - 50 No Yes Yes Yes 
NAVAUDSVC 
WASHINGTON DC 
0 - 5 Greater than 20 21 - 50 Yes Yes No Yes 
NAVBASE KITSAP  
SILVERDALE  WA 
Greater than 20 Greater than 20 Greater than 75 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NAVCOMM DET 
CHINHAE KOR 
0 - 5 6-10 0 - 20 No Yes Yes Yes 
NAVCOMTELSTA FAR 
EAST 
0 - 5 Greater than 20 Greater than 75     
nAVCOMTELSTA FAR 
EAST 
0 - 5 0 - 5 0 - 20 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NAVCOMTELSTA FAR 
EAST YOKOSUKA JA 
6-10 6-10 21 - 50     
NAVCOMTELSTA FAR 
EAST YOKOSUKA JA 
0 - 5 6-10 21 - 50 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NAVCOMTELSTA 
JACKSONVILLE DET 
KEY WEST FL 
0 - 5 6-10 0 - 20 No Yes Yes Yes 
NAVCOMTELSTA 
NAPLES IT 
11-20 6-10 Greater than 75 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NAVCOMTELSTA SICILY 
IT 
0 - 5 6-10 21 - 50 No Yes No Yes 
NAVCRUITDIST 
COLUMBUS OH 
0 - 5 0 - 5 0 - 20 No Yes No Yes 
NAVCRUITDIST DALLAS 
TX 
0 - 5 0 - 5 0 - 20 No Yes Yes Yes 
NAVCRUITDIST NASH  0 - 5 0 - 5 21 - 50 No Yes Yes Yes 
NAVCRUITDIST 
SEATTLE WA 
0 - 5 0 - 5 0 - 20 No Yes Yes Yes 
NAVCYBERDEFOPSCOM 11-20 Greater than 20 Greater than 75 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Email DMDS DMS 
NORFOLK VA 
NAVDRUGLAB 0 - 5 0 - 5 0 - 20 No No No Yes 
NAVDRUGLAB GREAT 
LAKES IL 
0 - 5 0 - 5 0 - 20 No No No Yes 
NAVDRUGLAB SAN 
DIEGO CA 
11-20 11-20 0 - 20 No No No Yes 
NAVENVIRHLTHCEN 
PORTSMOUTH VA 
0 - 5 6-10 21 - 50 Yes Yes Yes No 
NAVFLIGHTDEMRON 0 - 5 6-10 21 - 50 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NAVHOSP LEMOORE CA 0 - 5 11-20 Greater than 75 No Yes No Yes 
NAVLEGSVCOFF 
MIDLANT NORFOLK VA 
0 - 5 0 - 5 0 - 20 No Yes No Yes 
NAVLEGSVCOFF SE 
JACKSONVILLE FL 
0 - 5 0 - 5 0 - 20 No Yes No Yes 
NAVMARCORESCEN 
LEHIGH VALLEY PA 
0 - 5 6-10 Greater than 75 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NAVMEDIACENFSD 
NORFOLK VA 
0 - 5 0 - 5 0 - 20 No No No Yes 
NAVMEDIACENSANDIE
GO(UC) 
0 - 5 0 - 5 0 - 20 Yes No No Yes 
NAVNUPWRTRACOM 6-10 6-10 Greater than 75 Yes No No Yes 
NAVOPMEDINST DET 
SURFWARMEDINST 
0 - 5 0 - 5 0 - 20 No Yes No No 
NAVOPSCENPIT 0 - 5 0 - 5 0 - 20 No Yes No Yes 
NAVOPSPTCEN DETROIT 
MI 
0 - 5 0 - 5 21 - 50 No Yes Yes Yes 
NAVOPSPTCEN 
GULFPORT MS 
0 - 5 0 - 5 0 - 20 No Yes No Yes 
NAVOPSPTCEN PEORIA 
IL 
0 - 5 6-10 0 - 20 No Yes Yes Yes 
NAVOPSPTCEN 
WHIDBEY ISLAND WA 
0 - 5 0 - 5 0 - 20 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NAVOPSPTCENERIE 0 - 5 0 - 5 0 - 20 No No Yes Yes 
NAVOPSPTCENFND 0 - 5 0 - 5 Greater than 75 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NAVOPTHALSUPPTRAC
T YORKTOWN VA 
0 - 5 6-10 Greater than 75 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NAVOSP CHERRY PT NC 0 - 5 0 - 5 0 - 20 Yes Yes No Yes 
NAVPERSDEVCOM 
NORFOLK VA 
0 - 5 Greater than 20 21 - 50 Yes Yes Yes Yes 




11-20 11-20 21 - 50 Yes Yes No Yes 
NAVSATCOMMFAC 
NORTHWEST VA 
0 - 5 0 - 5 21 - 50 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NAVSEA  DET RASO 
YORKTOWN VA 
0 - 5 0 - 5 0 - 20 Yes No No Yes 
NAVSEA 
INACTSHIPMAINTO 
PEARL HARBOR HI 




0 - 5 0 - 5 0 - 20 Yes No No Yes 
NAVSEA INACTSHIPOFF 
PORTSMOUTH VA 
0 - 5 0 - 5 0 - 20 No Yes No Yes 
NAVSEA INACTSHIPOFF 
PORTSMOUTH VA 
0 - 5 0 - 5 0 - 20 No Yes No Yes 
NAVSPECWARCEN DET 
SDV PANAMA CITY FL. 
0 - 5 0 - 5 21 - 50 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NAVSTA INGLESIDE TX 0 - 5 Greater than 20 Greater than 75 No Yes Yes Yes 
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Email DMDS DMS 
NAVSTA NORFOLK VA Greater than 20 Greater than 20 Greater than 75 Yes No Yes Yes 
NAVSUBSUPPFAC NEW 
LONDON CT 




0 - 5 0 - 5 0 - 20 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NAVSURFWARCEN DET 
BREMERTON 
0 - 5 0 - 5 21 - 50 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NAVSURFWARCEN 
PHDIV VIRGINIA BEACH 
VA 
0 - 5 11-20 21 - 50 No No No Yes 
NAVSURFWARCEN 
PORT HUENEME DIV 
DET LOUISVILLE KY 




0 - 5 Greater than 20 Greater than 75 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NAVSURFWARCENDIV 
INDIAN HEAD 
0 - 5 0 - 5 21 - 50     
NAVTREATYSUPPORT 
INDIAN HEAD MD 
0 - 5 6-10 0 - 20 No No Yes Yes 
NAVUNSEAWARCEN 
DET AUTEC ANDROS 
ISLAND BAHAMAS 
11-20 11-20 51 - 75     
NAVUNSEAWARCENDIV 
KEYPORT WA 
Greater than 20 Greater than 20 Greater than 75 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NAVY BAND 
WASHINGTON DC 
0 - 5 0 - 5 0 - 20 No Yes No Yes 
NAVY GSM 6-10 6-10 0 - 20 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NCTAMS LANT DET 
SOUDA BAY GR 
0 - 5 0 - 5 0 - 20 No Yes Yes Yes 
NCTAMS LANT Norfolk  
VA 
Greater than 20 Greater than 20 Greater than 75 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NCTAMS LANT 
NORFOLK VA 
Greater than 20 Greater than 20 Greater than 75 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NCTAMS LANT 
NORFOLK VA 
Greater than 20 Greater than 20 Greater than 75 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NCTAMSLANTDETGTMO 0 - 5 0 - 5 21 - 50 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NCTAMSPAC Greater than 20 Greater than 20 Greater than 75     
NETPDTC 0 - 5 Greater than 20 Greater than 75 Yes No Yes Yes 
NETSAFA PENSACOLA 
FL 
0 - 5 11-20 21 - 50 No Yes Yes Yes 
NETWARCOM NORFOLK 
VA 
Greater than 20 Greater than 20 Greater than 75     
NMCB 18 0 - 5 0 - 5 0 - 20 No Yes No Yes 
NMCCEDSP 0 - 5 0 - 5 21 - 50 No Yes Yes Yes 
NMSC DET 
MILMEDSUPPOFF 
GREAT LAKES IL 
0 - 5 0 - 5 0 - 20 No Yes No Yes 
NOSC ERIE 0 - 5 0 - 5 0 - 20 Yes No Yes Yes 
NOSC PEORIA 6-10 6-10 0 - 20 No Yes Yes Yes 
NOSC WILMINGTON DE 0 - 5 0 - 5 0 - 20 Yes No Yes Yes 
NRL DET STENNIS 
SPACE CENTER MS 
0 - 5 0 - 5 21 - 50 No Yes No Yes 




0 - 5 0 - 5 21 - 50 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NROTC NOTRE DAME 
UNIVERSITY 
0 - 5 0 - 5 0 - 20 No Yes Yes Yes 
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0 - 5 6-10 0 - 20 Yes No No Yes 
NROTCU CHICAGO 
AREA EVANSTON IL 
0 - 5 0 - 5 0 - 20 No Yes No Yes 
NROTCU HOLY CROSS 
WORCESTER MA 
0 - 5 0 - 5 0 - 20 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NROTCU IOWA STATE 
UNIV AMES IA 
0 - 5 0 - 5 0 - 20 No No No Yes 
NROTCU JACKSONVILLE 
UNIV JACKSONVILLE FL 
0 - 5 0 - 5 0 - 20 No Yes No Yes 
NROTCU LOS ANGELES 
CA 
0 - 5 0 - 5 0 - 20 No Yes No Yes 
NROTCU MARQUETTE 
UNIV 
0 - 5 0 - 5 0 - 20 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NROTCU NORTH 
CAROLINA PIEDMONT 
REGION DURHAM NC 
0 - 5 0 - 5 0 - 20 Yes Yes No Yes 
NROTCU PURDUE UNIV 
WEST LAFAYETTE IN 
0 - 5 0 - 5 0 - 20 No Yes Yes Yes 
NROTCU PURDUE UNIV 
WEST LAFAYETTE IN 
6-10 6-10 0 - 20 Yes Yes No Yes 
NROTCU SOUTHERN 
UNIV BATON ROUGE LA 
0 - 5 0 - 5 0 - 20 No Yes No No 
NROTCU UNIV OF 
MICHIGAN 
0 - 5 0 - 5 0 - 20 Yes Yes Yes No 
NROTCU UNIV OF 
NEBRASKA LINCOLN NE 
0 - 5 0 - 5 0 - 20 No Yes No Yes 
NROTCU UNIVERSITY 
OF MINNESOTA 
0 - 5 0 - 5 0 - 20 No No No Yes 
NROTCU VMI 0 - 5 0 - 5 0 - 20 No No Yes Yes 
NSSC NORFOLK VA 11-20 Greater than 20 Greater than 75 No Yes Yes No 
OTC NEWPORT 0 - 5 Greater than 20 Greater than 75 No Yes Yes Yes 
PATRON NINE 6-10 Greater than 20 Greater than 75 Yes No No Yes 
PATRON THREE ZERO 0 - 5 11-20 Greater than 75 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
PERSUPP DET 
BRUNSWICK ME 
11-20 Greater than 20 21 - 50 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
PERSUPP DET CORPUS 
CHRISTI TX 
0 - 5 0 - 5 21 - 50 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
PERSUPP DET FT 
GEORGE G MEADE MD 
0 - 5 11-20 21 - 50 No Yes Yes Yes 
PERSUPP DET 
INGLESIDE TX 
0 - 5 6-10 0 - 20 No Yes Yes Yes 
PERSUPP DET NEWPORT 
RI 
6-10 0 - 5 0 - 20 No Yes Yes Yes 
PERSUPPDET KEY WEST 0 - 5 11-20 0 - 20 No Yes Yes Yes 
PERSUPPDET PATUXENT 
RIVER MD 
0 - 5 11-20 21 - 50 Yes Yes Yes No 
PHIBCB-2 0 - 5 0 - 5 21 - 50 Yes No Yes Yes 
RESOPTCENMIAMI 61927 0 - 5 0 - 5 0 - 20 No Yes Yes Yes 
RLSO MID-ATLANTIC 
NORFOLK VA 
0 - 5 6-10 Greater than 75 No Yes Yes Yes 
SEACONWEPSCOL 
JACKSONVILLE FL 
0 - 5 0 - 5 21 - 50 Yes No Yes Yes 
SOUTHEAST RMC 
MAYPORT FL 
Greater than 20 Greater than 20 Greater than 75 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
SOUTHWEST RMC SAN 
DIEGO 
Greater than 20 Greater than 20 21 - 50 Yes No Yes Yes 
SPAWARSYSCEN 
CHARLESTON SC 
Greater than 20 Greater than 20 Greater than 75 No Yes Yes Yes 
SPAWARSYSCEN 6-10 6-10 0 - 20 No No No No 
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Email DMDS DMS 
CHASN, Code 523 
SPAWARSYSCEN SAN 
DIEGO CA 
Greater than 20 Greater than 20 Greater than 75 No Yes Yes Yes 
SPEC PROJ PATRON ONE 11-20 11-20 Greater than 75     
STRKFITRON ONE FIVE 
FOUR 
11-20 Greater than 20 Greater than 75 Yes No Yes Yes 
SUBTORPFACYORKTOW
N VA 
0 - 5 0 - 5 21 - 50 Yes Yes Yes No 
SUPPLY SUPBN TWO 
WEST HARTFORD CT 
0 - 5 0 - 5 0 - 20 Yes No No Yes 
TRANSITPERSU GLAKES 0 - 5 6-10 21 - 50 No Yes Yes Yes 
TRARON TWO TWO 0 - 5 Greater than 20 51 - 75     
TRARONFOUR 
PENSACOLA FL 
0 - 5 0 - 5 21 - 50 No Yes Yes Yes 




11-20 Greater than 20 0 - 20 Yes No No No 
USNA ANNAPOLIS MD Greater than 20 Greater than 20 51 - 75 No Yes Yes Yes 
USS BLUE RIDGE / 
COMSEVENTHFLT 
Greater than 20 Greater than 20 Greater than 75 Yes Yes Yes No 
We guard for over 100 
PLA's 
Greater than 20 Greater than 20 Greater than 75 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
WPNSTA CHARLESTON 
NC 
Greater than 20 Greater than 20 Greater than 75 No Yes Yes Yes 
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APPENDIX D.  SQL QUERIES DEVELOPED IN MICROSOFT 
ACCESS 
The following are the SQL queries developed used the query 
design wizard to determine the business process type for 
each respondent: 
 Outbound: SMTP Proxy 
Inbound: DMDS Folder Delivery 
(< 20 Releasers) 
 
SELECT SurveyResults.ResultsID, SurveyResults.PLA, 
SurveyResults.NumberofMessageReleasers, SurveyResults.NumberofMessageDrafters, 
SurveyResults.NumberofMessageReaders, SurveyResults.ReadBoard, 
SurveyResults.Email, SurveyResults.DMDS, SurveyResults.DMS 
FROM SurveyResults 
WHERE ((Not (SurveyResults.NumberofMessageReleasers)="greater than 20") AND 
((SurveyResults.NumberofMessageDrafters)="Greater than 20") AND 
((SurveyResults.ReadBoard)="yes")); 
 
 Outbound: SMTP Proxy 
Inbound: DMDS Folder Delivery 
(> 20 Releasers) 
 
SELECT SurveyResults.ResultsID, SurveyResults.PLA, 
SurveyResults.NumberofMessageReleasers, SurveyResults.NumberofMessageDrafters, 
SurveyResults.NumberofMessageReaders, SurveyResults.ReadBoard, 
SurveyResults.Email, SurveyResults.DMDS, SurveyResults.DMS 
FROM SurveyResults 
WHERE (((SurveyResults.NumberofMessageReleasers)="greater than 20") AND 
((SurveyResults.ReadBoard)="yes")); 
 
 Outbound: SMTP Proxy 
Inbound: DMDS User Delivery 
(< 20 Releasers) 
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SELECT SurveyResults.*, SurveyResults.ResultsID, SurveyResults.PLA, 
SurveyResults.NumberofMessageReleasers, SurveyResults.NumberofMessageDrafters, 
SurveyResults.NumberofMessageReaders, SurveyResults.ReadBoard, 
SurveyResults.Email, SurveyResults.DMDS, SurveyResults.DMS 
FROM SurveyResults 
WHERE ((Not (SurveyResults.NumberofMessageReleasers)="greater than 20") AND 
((SurveyResults.NumberofMessageDrafters)="greater than 20") AND 
((SurveyResults.ReadBoard)="no")); 
 Outbound: SMTP Proxy 
Inbound: DMDS User Delivery 
(> 20 Releasers) 
 
SELECT SurveyResults.*, SurveyResults.ResultsID, SurveyResults.PLA, 
SurveyResults.NumberofMessageReleasers, SurveyResults.NumberofMessageDrafters, 
SurveyResults.NumberofMessageReaders, SurveyResults.ReadBoard, 
SurveyResults.Email, SurveyResults.DMDS, SurveyResults.DMS 
FROM SurveyResults 
WHERE (((SurveyResults.NumberofMessageReleasers)="greater than 20") AND 
((SurveyResults.ReadBoard)="no")); 
 
 Outbound: Web Proxy 
Inbound: DMDS Folder Delivery 
 
SELECT SurveyResults.*, SurveyResults.ResultsID, SurveyResults.PLA, 
SurveyResults.NumberofMessageReleasers, SurveyResults.NumberofMessageDrafters, 
SurveyResults.NumberofMessageReaders, SurveyResults.ReadBoard, 
SurveyResults.Email, SurveyResults.DMDS, SurveyResults.DMS 
FROM SurveyResults 
WHERE ((Not (SurveyResults.NumberofMessageReleasers)="greater than 20") AND 
(Not (SurveyResults.NumberofMessageDrafters)="greater than 20") AND (Not 
(SurveyResults.NumberofMessageReaders)="0 - 20") AND 
((SurveyResults.ReadBoard)="YES")); 
 
 Outbound: Web Proxy 
Inbound: DMDS User Delivery 
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SurveyResults.Email, SurveyResults.DMDS, SurveyResults.DMS 
FROM SurveyResults 
WHERE (((SurveyResults.NumberofMessageReleasers)<>"greater than 20") 
AND ((SurveyResults.NumberofMessageDrafters)<>"greater than 20") AND 
((SurveyResults.NumberofMessageReaders)<>"0 - 20") AND 
((SurveyResults.ReadBoard)="no")); 
     
 Outbound: Web Proxy 
Inbound: Web Bulletin Board Delivery 




SurveyResults.Email, SurveyResults.DMDS, SurveyResults.DMS 
FROM SurveyResults 
WHERE (((SurveyResults.NumberofMessageReleasers)<>"greater than 20") 
AND ((SurveyResults.NumberofMessageDrafters)<>"greater than 20") AND 
((SurveyResults.NumberofMessageReaders)="0 - 20") AND 
((SurveyResults.ReadBoard)="yes")); 
 
 Outbound: Web Proxy 
Inbound: Web User Delivery 
 




SurveyResults.Email, SurveyResults.DMDS, SurveyResults.DMS 
FROM SurveyResults 
WHERE (((SurveyResults.NumberofMessageReleasers)<>"greater than 20") 
AND ((SurveyResults.NumberofMessageDrafters)<>"greater than 20") AND 
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APPENDIX E.  REPORTS GENERATED IN MICROSOFT ACCESS 
FOR EACH BUSINESS PROCESS 
 Outbound: SMTP Proxy 
 Inbound: DMDS User Delivery 
 (< 20 Releasers) 
 PLA 
 NAVSTA INGLESIDE TX 
 NSSC NORFOLK VA 
 OTC NEWPORT 
 TRIREFFAC KINGS BAY 
 Count: 4 
 
 Outbound: SMTP Proxy 
 Inbound: DMDS User Delivery 
 (> 20 Releasers) 
 PLA 
 APL JHU LAUREL MD 
 COMPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI 
 COMSPAWARSYSCOM SAN DIEGO CA 
 SPAWARSYSCEN CHARLESTON SC 
 SPAWARSYSCEN SAN DIEGO CA 
 USNA ANNAPOLIS MD 
 WPNSTA CHARLESTON NC 
 Count: 7 
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Outbound:  SMTP Proxy 
 Inbound:  DMDS Folder Delivery 
 (> 20 Releasers) 
 PLA 
 COMNAVAIRWARCENACDIV PATUXENT RIVER MD 
 COMNAVREG SW SAN DIEGO CA 
 COMPATRECONWING ELEVEN 
 NAS OCEANA VA 
 NAVBASE KITSAP  SILVERDALE  WA 
 NAVSTA NORFOLK VA 
 NAVUNSEAWARCENDIV KEYPORT WA 
 NCTAMS LANT Norfolk  VA 
 NCTAMS LANT NORFOLK VA 
 NCTAMS LANT NORFOLK VA 
 SOUTHEAST RMC MAYPORT FL 
 SOUTHWEST RMC SAN DIEGO 
 USS BLUE RIDGE / COMSEVENTHFLT 
 We guard for over 100 PLA's 
 Count: 14 
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Outbound:  SMTP Proxy 
 Inbound:  DMDS Folder Delivery 
 (< 20 Releasers) 
 PLA 
 COMNAVREG MIDLANT NORFOLK VA 
 COMNAVSEASYSCOM WASHINGTON DC 
 COMNCWGRU TWO PORTSMOUTH VA 
 FACSFAC VACAPES 
 NAS JAX 
 NAVAUDSVC WASHINGTON DC 
 NAVCYBERDEFOPSCOM NORFOLK VA 
 NAVPERSDEVCOM NORFOLK VA 
 NAVSURFWARCEN SHIPSYSENGSTA PHILADELPHIA PA 
 NETPDTC 
 NRL WASHINGTON DC 
 PATRON NINE 
 PERSUPP DET BRUNSWICK ME 
 STRKFITRON ONE FIVE FOUR 
 TRITRAFAC BANGOR WA/TSD PACNORWEST BANGOR WA 
 Count: 15 
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 Outbound:  Web Proxy 
 Inbound:  DMDS Folder Delivery 
 PLA 
 AIMD JACKSONVILLE FL 
 AIMD TRUAX CORPUS 
 CENNAVAVNTECHTRA PENSACOLA FL 
 CENNAVLEADERSHIP DAM NECK VA 
 CENSEABEESFACENG DET FT LEONARD WOOD MO 
 CENTECTRAGRU DET ATSUGI 
 CNATRA CORPUS CHRISTI TX 
 COMNAVSAFECEN NORFOLK VA 
 COMOMAG CORPUS CHRISTI TX 
 COMTRAWING FIVE MILTON FL 
 COMTRAWING TWO KINGSVILLE TX 
 FACSFAC VACAPES 
 HELSEACOMBATRON TWO 
 HSL SIX ZERO MAYPORT FL 
 NACOPSPTCEN 
 NAS CORPUS CHRISTI TX 
 NAVCOMTELSTA FAR EAST YOKOSUKA JA 
 NAVCOMTELSTA NAPLES IT 
 NAVENVIRHLTHCEN PORTSMOUTH VA 
 NAVFLIGHTDEMRON 




 NAVOPTHALSUPPTRACT YORKTOWN VA 
 NAVRESREDCOM MIDLANT WASHINGTON DC 
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 NAVSATCOMMFAC NORTHWEST VA 
 NAVSPECWARCEN DET SDV PANAMA CITY FL. 
 NAVSURFWARCEN DET BREMERTON 
 NCTAMSLANTDETGTMO 
 NROTC NORTH CAROLINA PIEDMONT REGION 
 PATRON THREE ZERO 
 PERSUPP DET CORPUS CHRISTI TX 
 PERSUPPDET PATUXENT RIVER MD 
 PHIBCB-2 
 SEACONWEPSCOL JACKSONVILLE FL 
 SUBTORPFACYORKTOWN VA 
 Count: 36 
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Outbound: Web Proxy 
 Inbound: DMDS User Delivery 
 PLA 
 AEGIS TECHREP MOORESTOWN NJ 
 AEGIS TRAREDCEN DAHLGREN VA 
 AIMD WHIDBEY ISLAND WA 
 COMNAVAIRSYSCOM//6.1.2.2  
 FISC SIGONELLA IT 
 FLELOGSUPPRON FOUR SIX 
 MINWARTRACEN INGLESIDE TX (UC) 
 NAVAMMOLOGCEN AMMOPAC SAN DIEGO CA 
 NAVCOMTELSTA SICILY IT 
 NAVCRUITDIST NASH  
 NAVHOSP LEMOORE CA 
 NAVOPSPTCEN DETROIT MI 
 NAVSUBSUPPFAC NEW LONDON CT 
 NAVSURFWARCEN PHDIV VIRGINIA BEACH VA 
 NAVSURFWARCEN PORT HUENEME DIV DET LOUISVILLE KY 
 NETSAFA PENSACOLA FL 
 NMCCEDSP 
 NRL DET STENNIS SPACE CENTER MS 
 PERSUPP DET FT GEORGE G MEADE MD 
 RLSO MID-ATLANTIC NORFOLK VA 
 TRANSITPERSU GLAKES 
 TRARONFOUR PENSACOLA FL 
 Count: 22 
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Outbound: Web Proxy 
 Inbound: Web Bulletin Board Delivery 
 PLA 
 63216 
 AIMD KEY WEST(uc) 
 CMIONORFALKVA 
 CNATRADETCC 
 EODMU SIX DET PANAMA CITY  FL 
 MSCREP SEATTLE WA 
 nAVCOMTELSTA FAR EAST 
 NAVMEDIACENSANDIEGO(UC) 
 NAVOPSPTCEN WHIDBEY ISLAND WA 
 NAVOSP CHERRY PT NC 
 NAVSEA  DET RASO YORKTOWN VA 
 NAVSEA INACTSHIPMAINTO PEARL HARBOR HI 
 NAVSEA INACTSHIPMAINTO PHILADELPHIA PA 
 NAVSUPPACT PERSUPPDET NEW ORLEANS LA 
 NAVY GSM 
 NOSC ERIE 
 NOSC WILMINGTON DE 
 NROTCU CARNEGIE MELLON UNIV PITTSBURGH PA 
 NROTCU HOLY CROSS WORCESTER MA 
 NROTCU MARQUETTE UNIV 
 NROTCU NORTH CAROLINA PIEDMONT REGION DURHAM NC 
 NROTCU PURDUE UNIV WEST LAFAYETTE IN 
 NROTCU UNIV OF MICHIGAN 
 SUPPLY SUPBN TWO WEST HARTFORD CT 
 Count: 24 
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 Outbound:  Web Proxy 
 Inbound:  Web User Delivery 
 PLA 
 CENSURFDETPHILADELPHIA, PA 
 CNATRA DET KINGSVILLE TX 
 COMSUBGRU EIGHT REP NORTHWOOD UK 
 DLD WC SUPP BREMERTON WA 
 DPTNAVSCI GLAKESMARICAD TRAVERSE CITY MI 
 NAVCOMM DET CHINHAE KOR 
 NAVCOMTELSTA JACKSONVILLE DET KEY WEST FL 
 NAVCRUITDIST COLUMBUS OH 
 NAVCRUITDIST DALLAS TX 
 NAVCRUITDIST SEATTLE WA 
 NAVDRUGLAB 
 NAVDRUGLAB GREAT LAKES IL 
 NAVDRUGLAB SAN DIEGO CA 
 NAVLEGSVCOFF MIDLANT NORFOLK VA 
 NAVLEGSVCOFF SE JACKSONVILLE FL 
 NAVMEDIACENFSD NORFOLK VA 
 NAVOPMEDINST DET SURFWARMEDINST 
 NAVOPSCENPIT 
 NAVOPSPTCEN GULFPORT MS 
 NAVOPSPTCEN PEORIA IL 
 NAVOPSPTCENERIE 
 NAVPTO PENSACOLA FL 
 NAVSEA INACTSHIPOFF PORTSMOUTH VA 
 NAVSEA INACTSHIPOFF PORTSMOUTH VA 
 NAVTREATYSUPPORT INDIAN HEAD MD 
 NAVY BAND WASHINGTON DC 
 NCTAMS LANT DET SOUDA BAY GR 
 NMCB 18 
 NMSC DET MILMEDSUPPOFF GREAT LAKES IL 
 NOSC PEORIA 
 NROTC NOTRE DAME UNIVERSITY 
 NROTCU CHICAGO AREA EVANSTON IL 
 NROTCU IOWA STATE UNIV AMES IA 
 NROTCU JACKSONVILLE UNIV JACKSONVILLE FL 
 NROTCU LOS ANGELES CA 
135 
 NROTCU PURDUE UNIV WEST LAFAYETTE IN 
 NROTCU SOUTHERN UNIV BATON ROUGE LA 
 NROTCU UNIV OF NEBRASKA LINCOLN NE 
 NROTCU UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA 
 NROTCU VMI 
 PERSUPP DET INGLESIDE TX 
 PERSUPP DET NEWPORT RI 
 PERSUPPDET KEY WEST 
 RESOPTCENMIAMI 61927 
 SPAWARSYSCEN CHASN, Code 523 
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